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INTRODUCTION
The following study of our Latin American trade
has been made with three purposes in mind; namely, deter-
mining the value that can be attached to our present
policies designed to encourage trade with the Latin
countries, investigating the possibilities of increasing
this trade in the future, and presenting a survey of the
history and problems of our trade with the southern coun-
tries since 1933. With these three objectives in mind, we
have divided our study roughly into three chronological
sections. The first section covers the period from 1933
to the outbreak of war in 1939 and is characterized
chiefly by the Good Neighbor Policy and the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Policy. The second section covers the
present war period and is characterized principally by a
new interest in Latin American trade, closer political
ties between the Americas, and a greater amount of atten-
tion to the difficulties confronting increased trade with
the southern countries. The third section points out
possibilities of the effects that various factors might
have on our future trade relations with Latin America and
endeavors to lay down certain general lines of action that
must be followed if we are to have an increased volume of
trade between this country and Latin America.
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FOREWORD
BACKGROUND OF OUR LATIN AMERICAN RELATION
"After the Congress of Panama, when Adams and
Clay were strongly advocating inter-American approxima-
tion, the cause of events had tended to foster suspicion
and rancor in the south, isolation and indifference in
the north. The annexation of Texas, the Mexican War and
the consequent territorial expansion, William Walker 's
filibustering expeditions, the various incidents that
changed the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and destroyed
faith in it, and finally, sperodic expressions of the
'manifest destiny' of the United States to extend its
domination southwards, were all matters that aroused
visible antagonism for many years in the Iberian repub-
lics. On the other hand, the Civil War and the stormy
reconstruction period that followed caused the United
States to concentrate its energies on the fundamental
and urgent task of healing the wounds inflicted on
national prosperity by that tragic internal struggle,
and thus to slight the task of fraternizing with the
southern countries. The cause and effect of that supine
ignorance prevalent in the United States about those
nations which a mendacious legend had painted in the
popular imagination as incapable of economic production
and inept in self-government, and as the irretrievable
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prey of backwardness, poverty, religious fanaticism, and
perpetual anarchy.
"But as the United States grew in population,
commerce, and industry, the country began to look toward
the vast expanse from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn.
During the decade from 1870-1880, foreign trade figures
began to make it clear to statesmen and financiers that
the United States ought to intensify relations of every
kind with the Iberian republics. Statistics showed with
cold eloquence that in Its dealings with Latin America
the United States had an unfavorable trade balance while
the balance of trade with Europe was greatly in its
favor. However, Latin America as a whole bought from
Europe much more than it sold to that continent , European
goods virtually enjoying a monopoly in the southern
nations of the Western Hemisphere. One North American
traveler described the situation in these words :
*From the little pin with which the lady fastens
her beau-catching ribbons to the grand piano
with which she enlivens and enchants the hear-
ing of all her household; from the tiniest
thread and tack and tool needed in the mechanic
arts to the largest plows and harrows...; the
drugs ... sold by the apothecaries; the fermented
and spiritous utensils are with rare exceptions
of English, German, Spanish, or Italian manu-
facturing. T
"In 1880 began the first move toward the Pan-
American Union and its policy of pushing peaceful com-
mercial relations. Senator Davis presented to the Senate
a bill *for the encouragement of closer commercial
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relations’ between the United States and Latin America.
The preamble to the bill stated that to the south of the
United States were industrious and progressive nations,
with whom the people of the United States hold, and
desire to maintain, the most friendly relations and with
whom a closer and reciprocal interest in trade and com-
merce ought to be encouraged.’ In 1889 the Pan-American
Union was formed. Along the path of Pan-Americanism
there have been stumbling and delay, slips and back-
sliding. It is easy to observe that from the Second
Conference to the Sixth, inclusive, reasons for antago-
nism, suspicion and prejudice between Latin and Anglo-
Saxon America tainted the continental atmosphere. But
withal, the contact of men and nationalities in the
deliverative halls had the slow and subtle, but strong
and continuous effect of smoothing asperities, dissolv-
ing prejudices, checking lack of confidence, and
placating animosity. ” (1)
(l) iilfaro, Ricardo F. (former President of Panama),
"A Half Century of Pan-Americanism”, Pan-American
Bulletin
,
April 1940, p. 216
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CHAPTER I
OUR HEW ROLE IN LATIN AIvERICA
In 1933, with, the inauguration of President
Roosevelt, a new kind of relations with the American
nations to the South was begun. It consisted of the Good
Neighbor Policy that defined the Good Neighbor as one who
“resolutely respects himself, and, because he does so,
respects the rights of others." In concrete terms, this
policy meant, principally, that the United States had
abandoned her interventionist policy which had consisted
of getting herself very much disliked and had adopted a
policy of cooperation and mutual trust with the Latin
American countries
. (1
)
^umner Welles further explained our new attitude
toward Latin America in the following words:
"Our new policy of the Good Neighbor has been
predicated upon the belief of this government
that there should exist an inter-American
political relationship based upon a recognition
of actual and not theoretical equality between
the American republics; on a complete forbear-
ance from interference by any one republic in
the domestic concerns of any other; on economic
cooperation; and finally, on the common realiza-
tion that, in the Vi/orld at large, all of the
American republics confront the same interna-
tional problems, and that, in their relations
with non-American pov^ers, the welfare and security
(1) McCullock, J. I. B. , "Challenge to the Americas,' 1
Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, New York,
19"4u, pp. v-y
.'•
.
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of any one of them cannot be a matter of
indifference to the others.” (1)
The establishment of this doctrine of mutual trust
and cooperation in our relations with the Latin American
countries has not been easy; the Latins did not trust the
"Colossus of the North." There were certain events in our
history that had left scars in the memories of our neigh-
bors. We had taken a huge slice of Mexico in 1849; we had
backed a revolt on the Isthmus of Panama in 1903; in the
twenties our marines were in Haiti; we had control of the
Dominican Republic finances, and we were supervising elec-
tions in Nicaragua. These were just a few of the acts of
our government that had earned for us sneers of "Yankee
Imperialism" and "Dollar Diplomacy. "( 2)
By dint of hard work on the part of our government
officials, led by Cordell Hull, and by reason of the pre-
carious state of world security, we had succeeded to an
amazing extent at the outbreak of the war in blotting out
the memory and the hard feelings of the past and in creat-
ing a solid foundation for future relations between the
American republics*
Some of the ways in which the government has
endeavored to act upon its declared policy have been:
(1) "Ybarra, T. R. , America Faces South , Dodd, Mead and
Company (New York, 1939) p. 305
(2) McCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., p. 8
Ybarra, T. R., Op. Cit., pp. 108-122 and p. 320
'.
.
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(1) to establish an Export-Import Bank to help finance
trade between the United States and Latin America,
(2) to abrogate the treaty with Cuba that gave the
United States the right to interfere in Cuban
affairs,
(3) to withdraw our Marines from Haiti and leave the
affairs of the nation solely to the Haitians,
(4) to sign reciprocal trade agreements,
(5) to help bring about the end of the war between
Bolivia and Paraguay, and
(6) to open United States Military and Naval schools
to students from Latin American countries* (1)
A further example of the effort put forth by our government
is evidenced by the following words of Cordell Hull con-
cerning the Montevideo Conference in 1933:
"The atmosphere was very bad when the conference
started. Some of the South Americans who were
delegates to it, accustomed to using an anti-
American attitude for political purposes, were
reserved and suspicious. I adopted a method of
calling informally on them. I would simply let
them know by telephone that I was coming to see
them. If they were busy, I saw someone else at
their offices; if not, I saw them personally.
Soon a free and easy spirit was established; why,
I talked with one of them while he was in his bath.’ -
there is nothing like getting to know foreign
statesmen. And they began to come and see me in
the same informal manner. As a consequence, before
the end of the conference, there was an enormous
improvement in the atmosphere. " (2)
(!) Ibid,” pp. 306-313
(2) Ibid, pp. 305-306
..
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The second factor that has helped us in establish-
ing our new doctrine has been the apparent collapse of
security in the world. The sorry plight of the weak
nations, which until the present war in Europe consisted
of attacks on Ethiopia, China, Austria, Albania, put a
jolt of fear into the Latins, a fear that was intensified
by the rumor that Hitler planned to gain control of Brazil.
(1)
Furthermore, Britain’s surrender to the Axis at
Munich in 1938 made our southern neighbors realize that
they could no longer depend upon the British fleet to keep
the threat of invasion away from their shores. (2) The
immediate result of all these events was that at the
Eighth Pan-American Conference held at Lima, Peru, in 1938,
the American republics formally agreed to consult together
should their security appear to be in danger. (3)
The results of several years of the Good Neighbor
Policy in overcoming the animosity of the Latins toward us
must be measured not in absolute terms, but rather in
relative terms. To be sure, the Latins, in general, do
not think of us in any higher terms than as mere foreigners
and rather queer ones at that, but they at least no longer
think of Uncle Sam as ”a swaggering, arrogant, uncouth
barbarian; as a ruthless collector, at the point of a pis-
tol, of money unscrupulously amassed through shady deals by
(1) McCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., p. 9
(2) Ybarra, T. K. , Op. Cit., p. 116
(3) McCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., p. 11
<.
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Amerleans in Latin America; as a brandisher of the "Big
Stick," who scorning the polite circumlocution so dear to
the Latins, thinks only of' exploiting others for his own
selfish ends."(l) Being considered merely as an outsider
is a much higher compliment than being called a big bad
wolf. (2)
In summing up the results of the Good Neighbor
Policy to the time of the present war, it is safe to say
that the foundation had been laid for real cooperation
between the United States and the other American republics.
The removal of many remains of ,fYankee Imperialism" had
tended to foster greater trust and better understanding -
thus making way for closer political ties and consequently
greater economic cooperation in the interests of the
defense and the welfare of the Western Hemisphere.
(1) Ibid, p. 11
(2) Ybarra, T. R. , Op. Cit., pp. 22-23
... :
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CHAPTER II
RECIPROCITY
With the advent of our program of greater under-
standing and cooperation between the American republics
and the United States, one would naturally expect the
formation of a new trade program that would result in
increased trade. Although we did not adopt a specific
trade program for increasing our Latin American trade, we
did adopt, in 1934, a general trade program that served
until the outbreak of the present war as the principal
means of stimulating commercial relations with the south-
ern countries.
The reciprocal trade agreements program was
initiated under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 "for the
purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of
the United States by regulating the admission of foreign
products into the United States in accordance with the
characteristics and needs of various branches of American
production so that foreign markets will be made available
to those branches of American production which require and
are capable of developing such outlets by affording cor-
responding market opportunities for foreign products in the
United States." To achieve this purpose the statute
authorized the President (1) "to enter into foreign trade
agreements with foreign governments, " and (2) "to proclaim
..
-11 -
such modifications of existing duties ... or such additional
import restrictions, or such continuance ... of existing
customs or excise treatment of any article covered by for-
eign trade agreements, as are required or appropriate to
carry out such agreements
.
11 The President may not modify
existing customs duties beyond 50$ nor may he transfer any
article between the dutiable and free lists. The duties
thus proclaimed by the President are applicable generally
to the products of all countries. However, the President
may suggest their application to the products of any
country "because of its discriminatory treatment of Ameri-
can commerce, or because of other acts or policies. " (1)
The procedure of the government in regard to
formulating trade agreements under the Act has been to
find products in a foreign country that can be imported
into this country without interfering greatly with domestic
production and also finding products that we can export to
that foreign country without offering serious competition
to the industries of that country. Francis Bowes Sayre,
Assistant Secretary of State, explains the procedure in
more detail as follows:
"For the administration of the Act a carefully
devised procedure has been set up on numerous
inter-departmental committees. The central
agency for operating the machinery is the Com-
mittee on Trade Agreements, composed of
(1) Statutes of the United States of America , Washington,
Government Printing Office, r934, 73rd Congress, 2nd
Session, 1934, pp. 943-945.
..
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representatives of the Departments of State,
Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce and of the
Tariff Commission* Its chairman is the Chief
of the Trade Agreements Division of the Depart-
ment of State. It organizes and superintends
the work of various sub-committees, directs
the preparation of all necessary studies, reviews
recommendations of sub-committees, and is respon-
sible with the aid of these sub-committees for
formulating the draft text of all trade agree-
ments. These draft texts and recommendations
are submitted through the Secretary of State to
the President for his approval*
"The Committee on Trade Agreements has organized
some forty or more inter-departmental sub-
committees. Some of these, known as * country
committees', are charged with studying the trade
of the United States and with formulating, for
the consideration of the Committee on Trade
Agreements, the tentative schedule of concessions
to be requested and given. Other committees are
charged with stiidying specific commodities; still
others are set up to study specialized problems,
such as quotas, exchange control, and discrimina-
tions against American commerce. Particular prob-
lems of major commercial policy are referred to
the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy, an
inter-departmental committee under the chairman-
ship of an Assistant Secretary of State.
"The United States Tariff Commission prepares data
covering each item on which a concession may be
granted by the United States; the Department of
Commerce prepares data concerning concessions
which may be asked from the foreign country.
Department of Agriculture experts are relied upon
for studies in regard to agricultural concessions.
The Treasury Department advises as to the revenue
aspects of proposed concessions and as to technical
questions of customs classification and administra-
tion. The State Department drafts the general
provisions, conducts the actual negotiations, and
functions as the coordinating agency in the entire
inter-departmental trade agreements structure.
"Close touch with the business world and interested
private individuals is maintained through publicly
announced open hearings conducted by a special
.*
'
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inter-departmental committee known as the Committee
for Reciprocity Information. H (1
)
It will he noticed from the above brief descrip-
tion of the reciprocal trade agreements program that the
Act of 1934 contemplated our total foreign commerce and not
just our Latin American* But, in spite of the fact that no
word of Latin America was mentioned in the Trade Agreements
Act, it can truthfully be said that reciprocity was our
Latin American trade program for the period under discussion.
This statement is easily borne out by the facts that there
was no other policy in regard to Latin America or trade in
general and that of all the trade agreements in effect in
1939 two-thirds of them were with our southern neighbors
.
(2
)
It is apparent, then, that even though we had no policy
expressly formed for our relations with the soiithern coun-
tries, we were not without one, for reciprocity served as
the basis and mode of trying to increase our Latin American
trade even though it was used for the same purpose in rela-
tion to other countries, too.
As a prospective policy to be applied to our
foreign trade we can say that the program was logical in
that it provided a means through the bargaining power
granted to the President for finding a common basis for
trade and for overcoming excessive trade barriers and trade
( 1 ) Sayre, Francis Bowes, n How Trade Agreements are Made,”
Reprint from Foreign Affairs , Department of State,
April, 1938
(2) Boston Herald, January 21, 1940
.*
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discriminations . Before the Trade Agreements Act we could
rely only upon the chance that we should not be discrimina-
ted against in Latin America, and that by some happy chance
our trade barriers would not greatly effect our commerce
with the southern countries. Congress could not be relied
upon to cope with the situation because that body of men
had always made the tariff walls higher in its attempts to
reform them. (1)
The Act changed our passive attitude to a more
nearly positive one; it opened the way toward taking
active steps in developing the commerce with our neighbors.
In the next two chapters we shall see how this policy
actually worked out.
(T) 0 1 Neal, E. A., "The Farmer Under the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements , " Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science
,
Columbia University, (Hew York, May 1940)
Mr. O’Neal says that the interests of our country are
so diverse that "log rolling" is a natural outcome of
any attempt on the part of Congress to lower tariff
barriers
•
k.
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CHAPTER III
WHAT THE PROGRAM HAS ACCOMPLISHED:
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
In Chapter II we described reciprocity as our
Latin American trade program and stated that the policy
was extremely desirable in that it opened the way toward
removing excessive trade obstacles that cause a restric-
tion of trade. In this chapter and the next we will con-
cern ourselves chiefly with the actual benefits received
from this program that envisioned leading the way toward
economic disarmament. The present chapter will attempt
to analyze what may be called the qualitative aspects of
the treaties and Chapter IV will discuss the quantitative
results •
It is impossible to state here all the benefits
that we received in regard to concessions and reduced
trade barriers, but a survey of a few of the trade treaties
with Latin American countries will give some idea of the
extent to which the program went in this direction.
Venezuela (l)
Tariff reductions granted to the United States
by Venezuela under this treaty covered thirty-five items
representing a value of more than >£5,000,000 and bindings
(assurances against upward revision of the tariff) covered
(l) Trade^Agreement between the U. S. and Venezuela, signed
'Jov. 6, 1959 , Dept, of State (Washington, th C~ 1959)
*
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sixty-one items representing a value of over $13,000,000
on the basis of our 1938 trade with that country. Both
bindings and concessions together totaled 35.9/£ of total
exports to Venezuela according to 1938 figures. The con-
cessions obtained from Venezuela cover such important Ameri-
can exports to that country as wheat flour, outmeal, pre-
pared milks, hog lard, lumber, iron and steel products,
automotive products and accessories, radios, refrigerators,
engines, pharmaceutical products, and paints.
The tariff concessions granted by the United
States to Venezuela cover fourteen items which in 1938
accounted for 38.3^ of the total value of the United States
imports from that country. The concessions granted to
Venezuela include a reduction of bO/o on the import tax on
crude petroleum and fuel oil on an annual quota of imports
not in excess of b% of the total quantity of crude petro-
leum processed in refineries in the continental United
States during the preceding ;year. The other concessions
granted to Venezuela consist of reductions on ground
barbasco root and tonka beans, and bindings on such products
as cacao, divi-divi, crude petroleum and fuel oil for ships'
supplies, and raw reptile skins.
It will be noted from this brief survey of the
treaty with Venezuela that we gained concessions chiefly on
manufactured products and temperate zone agricultural
products and that we granted concessions on crude petroleum
.*
.
.
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and tropical products. In other words, we gave concessions
on products that, with the exception of petroleum, we have
to import and Venezuela gave concessions on products that
she has to import. Petroleum, the one exception to this
statement, is on a quota basis, so that our petroleum indus-
try is afforded only a negligible amount of competition.
Putting a quota on a product is certainly not in the best
interests of increasing trade with Venezuela, but the mere
fact that we have gone far enough to let any foreign
petroleum into this country is a step in the right direction.
Nicaragua ( 1
)
Concessions granted to the United States by
Nicaragua consisted of reductions on nine items and bindings
on twenty-four others. The products affected were proprie-
tary and patent medicines, paints and varnishes, lard,
pressed fruits, preserved vegetables, dried fruits, pre-
served fruits, and milk products. Most machinery and re-
lated products were already on the free list and duties
were low on the others*
Concessions granted to Nicaragua by the United
States are necessarily few in number due to the fact that
over 96$ of our imports from Nicaragua are duty free. (2)
A reduction was granted on "Peru" balsam and bindings were
Tl) Trade Agreement between the U. S. and Nicaragua, signed
March 11, 1936, Dept, of State (Washington, D. C. , 1936
)
(2) Nicaragua has duties for revenue purposes only
.•
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given on coffee, cocon beans, bananas, cabinet woods in the
log, deerskins, logwood, crude epicoe, reptile skins, and
turtles.
Once again we can see the complementary character
of the trade agreements. Both countries received conces-
sions on products that would not compete with the industries
and agriculture of the other country and granted concessions
on goods that they would have to import.
Ecuador (1)
Nearly one -half of United States exports to
Ecuador, which amounted to a total of a little over
$5,000,000 in 1937, receive direct benefits from the agree-
ment. About 22% of these total exports benefit from duty
reductions and about 2Q%> are safeguarded by assurances
against duty increases. Four leading American exports,
flour, hog lard, passenger automobiles, and lubricants
benefit from substantial reductions in tariff rates, while
motor trucks, agricultural hand tools, office appliances,
and certain electrical apparatus are among the more important
products assured of continued entry under existing moderate
rates. In addition, the agreement continued the extension
to a long list of United States export commodities of the
special schedule of tariff rates which are lower than the
general rates of duty and which are granted to imports from
(1) Trade Agreement between the U. S, and Ecuador, s igned
August 6, r&3&. Dept*, of State (Washington, D. C., 1938)
,»:. ? ’< v * <
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certain countries with which Ecuador has commercial agree-
ments. This special schedule includes rates 30$ below the
general duties, affecting such important commodities as
radio apparatus, cutlery, certain textiles, and vegetable
oils. Over two hundred individual products are benefited
by the provisions of the schedule.
Concessions granted by the United States to
Ecuador consist of assurances of continued free entry on
bananas and plantains, coffee, cocoa beans, cinchona bark,
kapok, annatto, raw reptile skins, balsa wood, and tagua
nuts, and reductions on "Panama" hats, naranjilla juice,
and on dried bananas.
This treaty, like the others, shows its comple-
mentary character. Ecuador takes manufactured products
and certain temperate zone agricultural products that she
must import, and we take tropical products that we must
import.
The complementary character of the above agree-
ments, which are typical of all that were concluded, can
not be emphasized too much, for the whole basis of the
treaties rested upon finding a country whose exports and
imports would fit into our economic structure. This fact
was one of the big flaws of the program because it is evi-
dent that it would be impossible to conclude a treaty with
countries that had economic structures that were similar to
ours rather than complementary. Argentina is a notable
.v
••• -
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example of the way that reciprocity failed when we tried
to apply it to a country whose economic structure was not
complementary to ours* Argentina has about the same cli-
mate as the United States and, consequently, competes with
us in agricultural products. We can not import Argentina's
meat and wheat, typical of her main exports, because we have
surpluses of our own that we must export. (1) Since we can
not grant Argentina any concessions, we cannot expect to
receive any, and consequently our trade agreement program
is of no value as far as our trade with that country is
concerned.
The fact that the program functions only with
countries having economic structures complementary to ours
and not with countries that have a competitive structure
earns for these programs the term ’’passive." In the last
chapter we said that reciprocity changed our passive atti-
tude to a more nearly positive one in that it opened the
way toward taking active steps in increasing our Latin
American trade. The program did precisely this as the
agreements that have been presented show. We did take
active steps which we could not take before the program went
into effect; v/e succeeded in lowering tariff barriers both
for our products and for Latin American products. Eut the
program was still on the passive side in that it did not
( 1 ) McCullock, J. I. E. , Op. Cit., p. 47
Ybarra, T. R., Op. Cit., pp. 122-135
..
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enable us to go far enough toward increasing our trade.
Under the program we could only strive to Increase commer-
cial relations by finding a complementary basis for trading
and then fostering this natural situation by sweeping away
artificial trade barriers. We were powerless to act when
we found a country that had no complementary basis for
trade with us. A really positive program would have taken
active steps toward changing competitive economic structures
into complementary ones, or else would have changed our
structure in order that competitive products would have
given way to production of complementary ones so that
increased trade would have been developed and not merely
discovered.
A further criticism that might be made about the
complementary character of the agreements is that since
trade generally arises wherever there is an economic basis
for an exchange of goods, a mere agreement between countries
to exchange these goods is nothing but the acknowledgment
of an already existing fact. This seems rather an unfair
criticism because very often there are artificial barriers,
such as quotas and duties, that overrule economic forces.
The trade agreements, by reducing these artificial barriers,
do more than to extend blessings to an already existing trade.
,
In the final analysis we are chiefly concerned with
actual dollar and cents results of the trade programs, and it
is this quantitative aspect of the agreements that wre will
attempt to discuss in the next chapter.
.*
.
.
-
. i J J
.
.
•
.
t
• - * . . . • • ' . - -*
.
-22-
CHAPTER IV
THE BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Any discussion of traae agreements puts one in
the embarrassing position of claiming, without being able
to prove this claim, that the treaties bring about an
increased volume of trade through their influence on reduc-
ing trade barriers. Undoubtedly, as we have said before,
the fundamental idea behind the treaties is excellent; it
is logical to claim that the treaties are beneficial to
trade since they abolish artificial trade barriers and per-
mit trade to flow freely according to the natural advantages
that a country may have in the production of certain prod-
ucts. But, unfortunately, we cannot prove definitely with
figures that we are correct in our conclusion because the
Department of Commerce, recognizing countless obstacles in
the way, has not produced figures to show just how the
products covered by the agreements reacted before and after
the passage of the trade agreements. This information is
important because we should have it to know whether the
change in the amount of trade with agreement countries as
compared to non-agreement countries was due to products
covered by agreements or to products not covered by agree-
ments. The importance of such information can be illustrated
by the following theoretical examples. (1) We may have a
case where our import trade has increased at a more rapid
*»
t -
.
*
-23
rate with agreement country A than with non-agreement
country B. Now, if we find that our increased trade with
A was the result of greater purchases of products upon
which we gave that country concessions, we can say that the
concessions (and, consequently, the trade agreement) were
responsible for the increased trade. If, on the other hand,
we find that the increased trade was due to greater pur-
chases of non-agreement products, we are forced to say that
the agreement is a failure because, evidently, it did not
help increase trade. (2) Nov; suppose that we have a case
where our imports increase at a more rapid rate from non-
agreement country B than from agreement country A. Again
we must examine the products. If we find here that the
greater increase of trade from the non-agreement country was
due to products not covered by the agreement with A, we can
not say that the agreement was a failure, for it can not be
expected to increase the trade of the products that it does
not grant concessions on. But if the more rapid rate of
increase of trade with B, the non-agreement country, was due
to products covered by the agreement with A, then we can say
that the agreement was a failure, because trade agreements
are supposed to increase the trade of the products upon
which concessions are given. Therefore we must judge trade
agreements not only by figures showing the change in the
amount of trade with agreement countries as compared to non-
agreement countries, but also by figures showing to what
:«.
.
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extent agreement products were responsible for the change.
We have presented examples only for imports, but the same
line of reasoning also applies to exports.
Although we do have some data on the reactions
of agreement products, which will be presented later in the
chapter, we call attention now to this problem of breaking
trade down into products mainly in order that the figures
below may be properly qualified. We want the reader to
realize that total figures in regard to the value of trade
with agreement countries must not be accepted at face value.
It can be seen from the accompanying chart that
the results of our trade agreement program as applied to
the world present a pleasing picture on the export side, at
least. Our exports to agreement countries increased 61 .2$
in the 1957-38 period over the 1934-35 period as compared
to 37.9/o for our exports to non-agreement countries. Our
imports from agreement countries in 1937-38 increased 35.2^
over 1934-35 as compared to 37.0/£ for non-agreement coun-
tries, evidencing a slightly larger increase from non-agreement
countries than from agreement countries. It is interesting
to note here that we did much better as a seller than as a
buyer under the agreements and thereby, either through
necessity or lethargy, retained our unhealthy mercantilist
policy of "sell everything and buy nothing.”
With the above paragraph as a background for the
general effects of the trade agreements program the v/orld
.. £
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over, let us pay particular attention to Latin America.
Here we find that our export trade with agreement coun-
tries for the period 1937-38 increased 47.2% over 1934-35
as compared to 33.3/2 for non-agreement countries, while
our import trade with agreement countries increased only
49*3/2 as compared to 54.5/2 with non-agreement countries.
These figures again show a more rapid rate of increase in
our exports than in our imports. In fact, our exports
increased at such a rapid rate that in 1938 our traditional
unfavorable balance of trade with Latin America was changed
to a favorable one.(l)
While these figures really should be broken down
into products in order to have an accurate picture of the
results of the trade agreements program, as they are now
presented they are by no means worthless in determining the
effects of reciprocity, for the trade agreements were the
main force operating to distinguish our trade with agreement
countries from our trade with non-agreement countries.
However, if we consider the reactions of certain
products in our trade with agreement and non-agreement coun-
tries we have a different picture than if we looked at just
the total trade figures. The total figures show that our
imports from agreement countries increased at a slower pace
(TJ Reprint from Commerce Reports , U. S. Department of Commerce,
OVashington, D~ C., Feb . 18, 1939)
U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade of the U. S .
for Calendar Year of 1958
,
Government Printing Office,
(Washington, D. TT. ) , p'p. 48-50
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than our imports from non-agreement countries, and, con-
sequently, indicate that as far as our Import trade was
concerned our trade program was a failure. On the other
hand, if we look at the products involved, we find evi-
dence to combat this conclusion. In 1957, the greater
increase of imports from non-agreement countries than from
agreement countries was due to heavy imports of raw mate-
rials and agricultural products, chiefly rubber, wool, tin,
copper, hides and skins, and grain fodder. These products,
v/ith the exception of nickel, are not covered by agreements.
The raw material imports were due to increased industrial
activity at home and the consequent need of more materials*
The increased imports of agricultural products were due to
droughts here and the resulting need of importing agricul-
tural products instead of exporting them. In 1S38, due to
the decline in industrial activity and better United States
crops, our imports of these products declined v/ith the
result that imports from non-agreement countries showed a
more rapid rate of decline than imports from agreement
countries. This same situation can be seen in 1939. For
the first six months of this year imports from agreement
countries increased at a more rapid rate than from non-
agreement countries but due to the greater industrial activi-
ty and the consequent increased imports of the same products
named above, the difference in the rate of increase of
imports from agreement countries was not so sharp for twelve
.
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months as for six months. (1) Since non-agreement products
were responsible for the greater trade gains from non-
agreement countries than from agreement countries, we can
not say the x^ogram was a failure. Trade agreements can
not be expected to increase the trade of the products that
they do not cover.
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace exhibits an
example of the extent to which agricultural products in
world trade benefited under the agreements. Mr. Wallace
praised the agreements in the following words
:
"Our agricultural exports to the sixteen
countries with which trade agreements were in
effect during the entire fiscal year 1938-39
were 15% higher than in the same countries in
the fiscal year 1935-36. On the other hand,
our farm exports to all other countries declined
19% during this particular period."(2)
If Mr. Wallace’s statement is impartial, we have
an excellent example of the aid given our exports by the
trade agreements, for during a time when our farm exports
were decreasing from non-agreement countries they were
increasing to agreement countries. It is possible that
these figures that Mr. V/allace exhibits are not an accurate
picture of the situation, for the drought of 1934, we have
seen, decreased our exports to a subnormal level, a decrease
that would affect exports to agreement countries more than
(1) Reprints from Commerce Reports , U. S. Department of
Commerce, Washington, IX (X
,
Feb. 8, 1939, August 19,
1939, and February 17, 1940
(2) ”Agriculture and the Trade Agreements Program", speech
delivered by Mr. Wallace before Congressional Hearing,
Jan. 12, 1940, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington,
D. C.
*.
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to non-agreement countries, because concessions would be
granted on our farm products which we normally export only
by countries that did not have a surplus of the same
products. (1) Therefore, when v/e were again exporting our
farm products in 1938-59 the return of our normal exports
to agreement countries would normally register a larger
percentage change than those to non-agreement countries.
Lynn R. Edminster, special assistant to the
Secretary of State, in speaking on the same subject said:
"Analysis shows that most of the increase to trade
agreement countries was accounted for by conces-
sion items, and that even in those trade agreement
countries to which exports did not increase, our
share of the total imports of such products into
these countries usually increased. " (2)
Mr. Edminster’ s statement is undoubtedly a delight to a
strong advocate of trade agreements, but to a person
endeavoring to be impartial in his approach, the statement’s
explanation of its source of information is not sufficient.
The Department of Commerce has not made any such analysis,
although it is possible that an equally reliable agency has
done so.
The United States Tariff Commission has analyzed
the reactions of a few products under the trade agreements
(1) Ibid, p. 3. Mr. Wallace says that "imports of agricul-
tural goods of the kind produced in the U. S. rose con-
siderably" for just two or three years after 1954 because
of droughts in this country.
(2) "Status of the Trade Agreements Program," speech deliv-
ered by Mr. Edminster on Dec. 1, 1939, U. 8. Department
of State, Washington, D. C.
..
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program, and we have chosen four of the products at random
in order to get an idea (the number of products is too
small to get any definite proof from them) of the reactions
of the trade agreements on the products they covered* The
figures given are for the world and not just Latin America*
Using 1929 as the base year equal to 100%, we find the
following for the four products in 1938: the index number
for leaf tobacco stood at 124% for agreement countries
(countries giving concessions to us) while it stood at
only 72% for non-agreement countries; the index number for
glass and glassware stood at 18% for agreement countries
and 52% for non-agreement countries; vegetable and vegetable
preparations, 45% for agreement and 26% for non-agreement
countries; grain and grain products, 53% for agreement and
44% for non-agreement countries* (1 ) Three of the four
products selected at random show a better standing for
agreement countries than for non-agreement countries. This
does not prove that the program was a success, but it can
not be construed as proving that it was a failure.
On the basis of the material that has been pre-
sented, we can probably conclude with a fair amount of
(1 ) "Tobacco and Tobacco Products and Reciprocal Trade
Agreement," U. S. Tariff Commission, Washington, D. C.,
May 1940, p. 7
"Glass and Glassware," p. 3
"Vegetable and Vegetable Preparations," p. 5
"Grain and Grain Products, p* 9
-.
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logic on our side that the trade agreements program, when
measured in terms of dollars and cents, probably did help
our trade with Latin America, although the amount that it
helped our exports was unjustified in view of the amount
that it helped our imports.
The trade agreements program did not end at the
outbreak of war in Europe, but we have dealt with it as
though such were the case, for after September of 1959
trading relations with Latin America were of such an
abnormal character that it would be impossible to determine
with any degree of accuracy the amount of increased trade
that was due to the agreements as compared to the amount
due to the war. During the period that we have studied so
far the agreements were the principal force in our Latin
American trade relations. After September of 1939, the
importance of the war pushed the importance of the trade
agreements down to a negligible position.
.'
,
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CHAPTER V
TWO PROBLEMS: NAZIS AND EXPROPRIATION
Before passing on to the war period, there are
two problems that arose in the period from 1933-1939 that
deserve attention, particularly because v/e do not yet
know just what their influence is going to be on the future
of our Latin American trade. The first of these problems
is that of Nazi penetration in the Latin American countries,
and the second is that of expropriation.
Newspaper reports during the past few years have
been painting a vivid picture of Nazi intrigue and attempted
conquest in Latin America. The following reports are typi-
cal of such newspaper items. One report states that the
attempted overthrow of the Uruguayan government by a Nazi
organization in 1939 was part of the general plan to seize
a large slice of South America. The seized territory would
be called "New Germany." According to evidence found at
the Uruguayan Congressional hearing, there exist all over
Latin America German organizations which receive instruc-
tions from Germany and whose purpose is the overthrow of
the Latin American republics. (1)
Another report states that the German Embassy
attaches in Chile spend up to ^100,000 monthly there for
propaganda purposes and that Germany buys more goods from
Chile than she needs just in order to win a hold on the
Cl) Boston Globe, July 10, 1940
*•
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country. The Germans in the country, the report continues,
make no attempt to conceal their activities; they even
maintain a political party and send representatives to the
national Chamber of Deputies. (1)
Dr. Victor Tlach, a former Austrian consul
general of our Middle Atlantic states who resigned his post
rather than display the swastika, is reported to have spoken
the following words
:
'‘The American people, especially the youth of this
country, have no conception of the danger to the
United States in the present world crisis. I am
certain that South America and Mexico, where the
Germans have obtained a solid foothold and where
the Gringo, as Americans are called, are disliked
are honeycombed with Nazis.” (2)
Congressman Dies in his investigation is supposed
to have found conclusive evidence that there are a million
Germans in Latin America who are controlled from Berlin
and most of whom have received military training in their
home 1 and
.
( 3
)
Mr. T. R. Ybarra, who is a son of a former
Venezuelan army general, says in his book, America Races
South
,
that the forms of Nazi penetration are many. Radio
broadcasts, newspaper advertisements, lectures at the
universities by German professors, and the granting of free
news features to newspapers are some of the methods that
ID Boston Globe, July 12, 1940
(2) Boston Herald, September 13, 1940
(3) Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1940
..
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the Naxis use to convert the Latins to the German point of
view. By exerting pressure upon the German population of
the Latin countries, the Nazis have been able to raise a
large following with which to further their plans in the
southern countries. On the economic side, Mr. Ybarra says
that by means of blocked marks Germany has purchased
practically the entire output of certain principal crops of
raw materials, effecting virtual economic domination of the
country in question. The blocked marks, however, were
becoming unpopular before the war broke out in Europe for
they restricted buying to Germany and provided no exchange
with which to buy in other countries. Furthermore, Germany
went back on her agreements by selling her purchases to third
parties, thereby depressing the prices of the products.
According to Mr. Ybarra, German successes in Latin
America are not likely to meet with much success in the
future because the Nazi methods hurt Latin sensibilities
and because the United States is definitely beginning to
combat Nazi influence with its own cultural and economic
programs
.
(1
)
In spite of the alarming reports that we receive
about Nazi penetration in Latin America, there seems to be
no good cause to fear that Germany will gain control over
the southern countries. Several of the Latin American
countries, by taking prompt action against Nazi plots, have
Til Ybarra, T. R. Op. Cit., pp. 53-64
..
.
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let the world know that they intend to uphold their national
dignity in the face of all threats. (1) Furthermore, the
outbreak of the present war in Europe has shown that the
Latins are predominantly in sympathy with the Allies. (2)
But whatever importance we attach to the Nazi’s
penetration of Latin America in regard to their gaining
political control of the southern countries, we can not
escape the fact that a strong organization working against
us can do considerable damage toward undermining our plans
for closer commercial relations with the Latins.
In spite of claims that the Nazis forced a large
part of our trade out of the Latin American market, trade
statistics indicate that these claims are not true. The
British, and not the Americans, have been the losers at the
hands of the Germans. It can be seen from chart II that
the American imports from Latin America remained about the
same during the years of Nazi rule while Germany’s increased
and Britain's decreased.
On the export side, as chart III shows, the
United States and Germany steadily increased their sales
while Britain decreased her sales each year.
The other problem, that of expropriation, is the
result of President Roosevelt's pledge, under the Good
TTj Ibid7 p. 57
(2) McCullock, J. I. B. Op. Git., p. 14
The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, April 5, 1940
..
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Neighbor Policy, not to back up American dollars in the
Latin countries with the United States Army and Navy,
Relying upon this pledge, three of the Latin countries have
seized property belonging to American citizens. Bolivia
seized interests of Americans in 1938 and then made an
agreement to sell the oil to Hitler. That act must have
irked Mr. Hull! Chile also expropriated oil properties
belonging to Americans and is now thinking of seizing
valuable copper and nitrate interests owned by Americans.
The seriousness of the Chilean threat of expropriation may
have been noticed a few years ago by observers of the stock
market. Anaconda copper fluctuated wildly up and down when-
ever a Chilean senator made a speech for or against expro-
priation. Mexico has been the third offender in regard to
expropriation. In 1938, Mexico took over all the foreign
owned oil companies operating in that country with only a
promise of payment sometime in the future when her finances
were in better condition. Mexico also made oil agreements
with Germany.
The reason for these acts on the part of the
governments of the southern countries is that the Latins
believe that foreign investment tends to exploitation of
natural resources primarily for the benefit of the foreign-
ers. Hence there Is a strong antagonism against any foreign
owned natural resource property in the Latin American
countries
. (1 ) It seems that this antagonism on the part
(1 J Ybarra, T. R. , Op. Cit., pp. 174-180
- ••
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of the Latins could be overcome to a large extent by
appointing natives to responsible positions in the American
firms operating in the southern countries. This action
should have the effect of removing the purely foreign
flavor of the American firms and give then the appearance
of being an organization of both Latins and Americans. It
should also have the effect of quenching the bitterness of
the young Latins who have ambitions to get ahead but find
practically all of their countries’ big businesses in the
control of the Gringos.
Mexico is the guinea pig in expropriation. All
of the Latin countries are watching the results of the
Mexican seizure in order to determine their own future
course in dealing with foreign investments. Bolivia and
Chile would like to seize more American property, and the
other Latin countries v/ould like to make their first
seizure, but none of the countries, except Mexico, has dared
to expropriate American property without making immediate
payment, for such a procedure is contrary to international
law. Mexico is the first example of a Latin country’s
breaking this law and the rest of the Latin countries are
waiting to see what happens before they try the same thing. (1)
If reports that have been received about the
results of the Mexican Government's taking over the control
IT] Ybarra, T. R. , Op. Cit., p. 180
. .
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of the oil properties in its territory are true, we are not
likely to see much more expropriation in Latin America for
some time, for the Mexican Government has been reported to
have admitted that the problems of finance, marketing, and
labor are too difficult for the government officials to
handle efficiently. Furthermore, Mexico, after expropria-
tion, is exporting mostly crude oil whereas formerly she
was exporting mostly manufactured petroleum products. This
means that Mexico receives a smaller net return than
formerly, and also loses the employment that resulted from
manufacturing the petroleum products. (1)
If this problem of expropriation is not solved,
it may prove disastrous to the development of our commer-
cial relations with Latin America. The causes or the mis-
understandings that bring about expropriation create bitter-
ness on the part of the Latins and the actual seizure of
the properties creates bitterness on the part of the
Americans. We cannot afford this bitterness if we wish to
develop closer relations with the Latin countries. The
effect that expropriation has on discouraging the attrac-
tion of American capital is particularly detrimental to the
development of trade with the Latin countries, for trade
flourishes more between nations that are highly developed
than between nations with primitive economics.
(1 ) The Journal of Commerce, New York, Aug. 27, 1940
..
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CHAPTER VI
THE MEW ENTHUSIASM FOR LATIN AMERICA
With the outbreak of the war in September of
1939, Latin America suddenly assumed a brand new importance
to the United States. People who had never heard the names
of Latin American countries before heard them now; the man
in the street became greatly concerned about the Nazis in
the southern countries; exporters became enthusiastic over
the prospect of a new boom in Latin American trade ; the
movies began to make more Latin American pictures; and even
cartoonists found room in their strips for a few words of
affection for our neighbors.
A newspaper editorial a few months after the
opening of the war commented upon this increased interest
in Latin America and attributed it directly to the war by
saying that the conflict abroad has caused the people of
the United States to realize the community of interests
that bind this nation to the other republics of the hemis-
phere. This common concern, the editorial pointed out,
relates not just to certain phases of political policy,
such as relative strength and relative weakness in a period
of world wide imperialistic aggression. Nor is it limited
to economic well being, because of the havoc of commercial
relationships produced by the war blockades and their
attendant hazards. Of far greater importance than these
two factors is the awakening to the fact that in this
..
\
.
-
hemisphere we have a peaceful land and the basis of a new
civilization away from the brawls and grudges of the old
world* (1
)
This third factor brings out our claim that one
of the reasons for this new interest in Latin America was
that the people of this hemisphere, looking with dismay upon
the self-destruction of Europe, became more determined than
ever before to put inter-American relations on such a high
moral and economic level that the nations of this hemis-
phere would be unlikely to war upon each other. We were
suddenly impressed with the blessing of living in a peace-
ful land; we were thankful that this hemisphere did not,
like Europe, have innumerable difficulties that could be
solved only by resort to war, and we resolved to keep our
own land peaceful*
Kendall Hoyt, in describing with a touch of
cynicism the new enthusiasm for Latin America, brings out
the political and economic reasons mentioned in the editorial.
’’South America has recently blossomed forth with
all imaginable press agentry as the new land of
promise. Cut off from their European markets,
the American Republics must now turn to the United
States for their purchases. This will help boom
our business and will provide traffic for our idle
shipping, barred from trade with the belligerent
countries. Wealthy South American tourists will
spend their annual shopping tours in the United
States, while our own tourists will visit our
South American neighbors, incidentally dropping
enough money to help build dollar balances which
(l ) Boston Globe, December 4, 1939
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will ‘build more trade. Through rapprochement as
to cultural relations as well as in commercial
matters, the Western sisterhood of nations will
become united for the defense of the hemisphere. " (1)
National defense was, according to Mr. Hoyt, the
political reason for our new concern over Latin America and
the promise of greater trade was the economic reason. We
were afraid that Germany would attack us by way of Latin
America and wanted to take all precautions toward avoiding
any such happening. (2) The economic reason arose from the
enforced withdrawal of Germany from the Latin American
market. We believed that the United States would be called
upon to fill the gaps left in Latin American imports by the
latter countries* inability to receive goods from Germany.
Only one of these three reasons mentioned as
being responsible for the new enthusiasm is conducive to
bringing about the kind of friendly relations that may
increase commercial relations with the southern countries,
and that reason is the desire for a peaceful hemisphere.
Any movement or any desire on the part of the people of the
United States honestly to try in every way to put commer-
cial and political relations on a high moral plane accord-
ing to the golden rule will go a long way toward earning
the respect and confidence of the people of Latin America
(1) Hoyt, Kendall, "The New Deal Discovers South America,
Land of Promise”, The Annalist
,
Nov. 23, 1939, p. 660
(2) See also Lyons, Louis M., k,Hull Tackles Our Achilles
Heel", Boston Globe
,
July 21, 1940
..
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and, therefore, can be considered as a powerful factor
toward increasing the amount of trade and economic coopera-
tion between the southern countries and the United States.
But now consider the influence of the other two reasons for
this new enthusiasm - (1) national defense and (2) increased
trade. First, we decide that Latin America is vital to the
defense of our country, so we immediately, in rather an
alarmed condition, put on our best smile and stage a demon-
stration of our deep love for the Latins. But the latter
are not so naive as we think; they know that we want some-
thing from them, and might even in their own interests
grant our requests for the immediate crisis at hand. They
will not, however, subject themselves to long-term commit-
ments, for what assurances do they have that the friendly
overtures of the United States will continue after the
threat to our security is over? Is it not probable that
our interest in them is not genuine, but the result of
fear for our safety, and that once the crisis is over, we
will immediately forget about them? And supposing in the
fever of these exciting times the Latins do make long-
term economic commitments with us, will they not feel
angered and humiliated when we lose interest? The Latins
would be in the position of a fiancee whose suitor’s
affections have suddenly cooled. (1)
Til Hanke, L. , "Plain Speaking about Latin America",
Harpers
,
Nov. 1940, pp. 588-590
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In regard to national defense, an editorial in
the Boston Globe says,
"We are bound to have an arrangement with the
nations south of us for our own protection.
This is the hard bottom of the matter. We would
have no more necessary interest in Paraguay than
in Albania except that South America is a region
in which we feel it unsafe to allow any great
power to get a foothold. ... We shall be lucky
if we get through this new period of the rule of
force in the world without having to return to
the policy of landing marines." (1)
The second reason for our new friendliness toward
Latin America is not, in our opinion, likely to awake a
favorable response from the Latins, for any offering of
friendship made with an ulterior motive in mind smacks of
insincerity. Furthermore, the Latins can humanly be
expected to resent our rejoicing at the prospect of new
markets because the same events that open up markets for
our products in Latin America shut down markets for Latin
American products in Europe. In the eyes of the Latins we
seem to be having a stroke of prosperity in taking Europe’s
place selling to Latin America while Latin prosperity is in
a poor state because Europe’s buying power as well as its
selling power is curtailed. In any event, this reason for
our friendly attitude toward the Latins is bound to be a
short lived one for the southern countries are ready to
trade again with Europe, new order or old order, whenever
commercial relations can be resumed. (2)
(1) Lyons, L. M. , "Hull Tackles our Achilles Heel," Boston
Globe, July 21, 1940
(2) Wood, Brycek "South America Eyes Its Defenders," Christian
Science Monitor . Boston, Nov. 23, 1940
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The sound basis for creating the kind of feeling
that will aid in increasing our trade with Latin America
is one which includes an under standing of the Latins"
culture and a genuine liking for them as people. We will
discuss this basis for friendly feelings in a later
chapter which will be concerned with the cultural relations
work being done by our government and private agencies to
create good will. We merely raise the question now in order
to point out that the basis for our new enthusiasm for Latin
America is not resting upon a firm foundation and in the
long run does not promise that our affections will be re-
turned. (1
)
(1 ) a recently returned traveller from South America quotes
the Latins as saying that they cooperate with us now
because they have no alternative, but as soon as the
war is over and their dependence on us is relieved,
cooperation will be more difficult.
*.
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CHAPTER VII
THE WAR AND POLITICAL RELATIONS
The political 3ide of our relations with Latin
America during the war underwent a completely new phase.
Before the war our primary Pan-American interest, on the
political side, "was maintaining peace within the Western
Hemisphere, rather than guarding against danger from abroad.
We were concerned chiefly with keeping the American repub-
lics from quarelling among themselves, settling such
quarrels as did arise. Remember that as late as 1932-35,
two of the South American countries (the two land-locked
ones, Bolivia and Paraguay) were fighting each other over
the Northern Chace."(l) Now with the outbreak of war and
the resulting threat of danger from abroad there came into
existence for the first time a genuine basi3 for a solid
Pan-American front. We all became united for the preserva-
tion of that which every nation in the hemisphere has in
common - the desire to retain political liberty of action.
Instead of offering to straighten out the Latins’ domestic
affairs for them, which they did not like to have us do, we
could now offer to defend them from aggression by an outside
power.
"Hitherto, Pan-Americanism had been slow uphill
work. The things that differentiate our twenty-one
( 1 ) Me Cullock , J. I. B., Op. Cit., p. 7
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countries have always been much more marked than
any real or fancied similarity. The Latin
American lands are quite different from one
another, as any one knows who has spent any time
there. For one thing, the racial mixture varies
from one country to the next. Some Latin American
peoples are almost entirely white, some are mostly
Indian, some (Brazil, for example) have whites,
Indians, and Negroes all mixed together. As
between Latin America on the one hand and Anglo-
Saxon America on the other, the points of dis-
similarity are, of course, even greater. Here
the obvious differences in historical background,
national culture, language, and predominant
religion have created fundamentally differing
mentalities
•
"Nor has the political development of our various
countries been the same. It is true that all of
us, except Panama, gained our national independence
by shaking off the control of a European power.
And though Brazil was an empire until 1889, it is
true that all of us eventually adopted the repub-
lican form of government. Here the resemblance
ends. When we talk of ’democracy 1 throughout the
Americas, as we frequently do, we are talking of
an ultimate ideal rather than a present condition.
A few of the countries - where conditions are
particularly favorable - have gone a considerable
way in the direction of true democracy. In certain
other countries, however, the term ’democracy’ is
simply meaningless. n (1)
No longer do we have to tread on this dangerous
ground of claiming common political and cultural ideals as
the basis of Pan-Americanism. In the foe from abroad we have
a real and not an imaginary basis for cooperation. It is
true that the Latin nations do not recognize the threat to
their independence as strongly as we do and that the danger
of invasion to most Latins seems remote, but it is generally
recognized by most of the southern countries that Hitler
(l) McCullock, J. I. 3., Op. Cit., pp. 9-11
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would like to see them flying the Nazi flag and that he
would not hesitate to use force to accomplish his desire
if he ever got the chance. The Latins are willing to
cooperate with us in seeing that the Fuehrer does not get
any such opportunity , (1
)
When the war broke out in September 1939 we were
not completely unprepared to act jointly. It will be
remembered that as a result of the Good Neighbor Policy the
American republics at the Eighth Pan-American Conference
in 1938 had formally agreed to consult with each other should
their security appear to be in danger. Accordingly, soon
after the outbreak of the war the foreign ministers of the
twenty-one republics, or their representatives, met in
Panama from September 23 to October 3, 1939. The chief
work of the conference was concerned with neutrality. First
of all, the ministers drew up a declaration of neutrality,
and then, because there are many interpretations of what
neutrality means, they set up a permanent Neutrality
Committee. The work of this committee is to make recommenda-
tions to the individual American nations and try to bring
their neutrality policies into agreement. One of the
ambitious projects of the Panama Conference in respect to
(IT Wood, B. , Op. Cit.
For a different view see McGuire, G., "Resentment as the
Salvation of an Age", Catholic Alumni Sodality Letter ,
Boston, March 15, 1941. Professor McGuire says that the
Latins are not the least concerned about Invasion.
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neutrality was to mark off a neutrality zone averaging
300 miles in width off the shores of this hemisphere.
The neutrality zone has not been respected by belligerent
nations as the Graf ^pee incident well illustrates, but
nevertheless, it did show that American statesmen could
convene and agree on a common policy.
When, in May and June of 1940, Hitler’s armies
overran Europe and brought France to her knees, new perils
threatened the 'Western Hemisphere. Germany might demand
outright control of the American colonies belonging to
conquered European nations, or she might allow the con-
quered nations to keep the colonies and control them
indirectly through puppet governments in the various capi-
tals. Any transfer of this sort would be violating our
Monroe Doctrine.
The United States could have coped with this
situation alone, but our new policy as a good neighbor
calls for a consultation of all the American nations when-
ever an important issue arises affecting their common wel-
fare. The minor delays of such a policy are considered
much less important than having twenty friends for neighbors
rather than twenty enemies. However, there is not much
doubt in our mind of what the outcome would have been if
the Latin countries had not, when consulted, reacted in the
same fashion we had planned. Obviously, we were not going
to have any Nazi outposts in this hemisphere even if the
southern countries rejected all our proposals to deal with
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the colony situation. The situation was going to be
decided in the interests of United States defense, but if
the cooperation of the Latin American countries could be
gained by a little diplomacy, then so much the better*
Friends are not so harmful as enemies and why cause bad
feelings unnecessarily? (1 ) Fortunately, the problem was
solved with the cooperation of the Latins at the Havana
Conference in July of 1940*
After some difficulty, a Convention was drawn
up by this Conference stating that
"If a non-American State shall directly or
indirectly attempt to replace another non-
American State in the sovereignty or control
which it exercised over any territory located
in America, thus threatening the peace of the
continent, such territory shall automatically
come into the provisions of this convention
and shall be submitted to a provisional admin-
istrative regime."
The Convention provides for a permanent Inter-American
Commission on Territorial Administration which decides
what sort of regime shall be set up. Further topics dis-
cussed at Havana were common action against fifth colum-
nists, economic solidarity, and military defense of the
hemisphere. Critics of the Conference say that action taken
in regard to the last mentioned problems was practically
worthless
.
(2
)
(1) Lyons, L. M. , Op. Cit.
(2) Y»ard, B. , Op. Cit. Mr. Ward says, "In the opinion of
Dr. Melo of Argentina the Conference failed to produce
any satisfactory plan for permanent economic collabora-
tion, and it is precisely in the economic sphere that
the most vital issues of hemispheric defense are found."
,.
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Since the Havana Conference, conflicting reports
have been received 'regarding our place in the affections
of the Latins. For awhile after our leasing of bases from
England there was a suspicion that the United States was
getting dangerously close to belligerency and violating the
spirit of the Havana Conference. This feeling died down
when Mr. Hull announced that the bases were open to all
the other American countries on the ’’fullest cooperative
bas is . "(1) President Comache of Mexico said at his inaugura-
tion that the Pan-American doctrine "is the only hope for
the salvation of civilization and international rights,"
and promised to cooperate in the building of a friendly
continental life. (2) The President of Honduras, in a mes-
sage to the opening of Congress said that Latin America
"owes gratitude to President Roosevelt for the introduction
of the Good Neighbor Policy in the international law of
this continent." He also pledged support to continental
cooperation. (3 ) From Brazil we have word that the United
States and Roosevelt are well liked there. (4) James Farley,
former Postmaster General, back from a vacation in South
America, reports that the war has caused a great increase
in friendliness toward the United States. (5) On the other
ill McCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., p. 27
(2) The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Dec. 2, 1940
(3) Ibid, December 6, 1940
(4) The Boston Globe
(5) The Boston Post, March 16, 1941
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hand, reports from Uruguay have shown antagonism. The
following quotation of a Uruguayan senator concerns efforts
of the United States to obtain naval bases there. "South
American Republics have plenty of reason to be on guard.
Vie do not want Caribbean treatment repeated here. That’s
why we repudiate Yankee bases here." In spite of this
kind of opposition, however, the plan was expected to go
through. (1) In speaking of Uruguay it is interesting to
note that last October we sent cruisers there to help
settle a domestic uprising in the form of a Nazi plot to
seize control of the government. The Uruguayan people,
instead of shouting against "Yankee Imperialism", gave the
cruisers a dramatic and overwhelming welcome. (2)
In February of 1940 there was a so-called River
Plate Conference which may be evidence of an anti-United
States attitude. The five countries around the River Plate
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina - formed a
Convention which considers the establishment of an economic
block of their own which will grant special concessions to
its own members which it will not grant to any other nation.
President Roosevelt sent the Conference a message wishing
them success and stating that its purpose is in the true
spirit of unity. The fact that the Conference sent sincere
Cl) The Boston Herald, Dec. 12, 1940
(2) The Boston Globe, October 3, 1940
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wishes to the United States for the "prosperity of our
sister nation" and the suggestion by one of the delegates
that the Western Hemisphere might achieve true Pan-
Americanism through a series of regional conferences tend
to allay our fears of unfriendliness .( 1
)
The difficulty in evaluating the extent to which
we have developed more friendly feelings with Latin America
during the war is that we have no positive action as evi-
dence upon which to base our judgment. We have only speeches
and promises which do not mean a thing until they are put
to a test. Also we have no way of knowing to what extent
the loss of hu.r0pean markets has forced the Latins into
our camp. The fact that the Latins 1 trade has suffered
severely due to the English blockade of Europe has caused
much suffering which can be alleviated to a large extent,
for the present, by loans from the United States. It is
our guess that the United States officials have not missed
an opportunity to apply a little pressure toward coopera-
tion in granting these loans. But, in spite of what may
lie underneath the surface of our political relations with
Latin America, it seems that any sincere actions on our part
to protect this hemisphere for the benefit of all its nations
is bound to result to our good in the minds of the Latins. (2)
(1 ) The Boston Herald, February 4, 1940
The New York Times, February 7, 1940
(2) McGuire, C., Op. Cit. Professor McGuire says that the
Latins do not understand our foreign policy at all and
do not understand just what we mean by defending the
Hemisphere.
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CHAPTER VIII
TRADE GAINS: FIRST YEAR OF WAR
The future of our Latin American trade looked
extremely bright In September of 1939 to people who could
not see beyond the horizon* Figures such as those pre-
sented below in Chart IV pointed out that with Germany's
enforced withdrawal from the Latin American market due to
England's control of the seas, there was room for increased
American exports to the southern countries. Upon this
assumption our export trade was expected to increase by
50^*(])The' products that we could be expected to sell and
the countries that we could be expected to sell them in
could be found by analyzing Germany's trade during 1938*
The German's had their tightest hold on the Brazilian
market* Here they were first in supplying wool yarn;
second in cotton piece goods; first in iron bars and rods,
wire and locomotives; first in electric motors; and second
in rails. Argentine, the second largest German market,
bought about half as much from Germany as she did from the
United States. The Argentines bought machinery, iron and
steel products, chemicals, drugs, and electrical equipment
from the Germans. The latter supplied over half of Chilean
imports of chemicals, drugs, and paints, and 40% of imports
of glassware and ceramics. In Colombia the Germans were
important suppliers of hardware, hand tools, barbed wire,
(1) Business Week, September 9, 1939, p. 58
• - - . u 4 \
:!•
.
1
..
•, ... i
.
:
«... t
,
.
,
•
. .
'
'
.
.
'
.
,
-i *
•• L"
'
'
' 1
,
,
.
fc .
,
'
• •
-
-
-56-
CHART IV
POSSIBLE MARKETS CREATED BY VU ORLD WAR II (1)
Imports From
(in millions of dollars)
Country Germany
United
Kingdom
United
States
Total
Including
All Others
Argentina 48.5 87.3 84.0 476.1
Brazil 73.3 30.7 71.5 295.4
Central America 13.0 4.2 37.0 70.7
Chile 26.7 10.9 28.6 103.5
Colombia 15.6 9.9 44.4 89.1
Cuba 4.3 4.5 75.2 106.0
Mexico 20.4 4.6 62.7 108.9
Peru 11.8 5.9 20.0 58.3
Others 34.7 18.2 71.5 152.0
249.1 176.2 494.9 1460.0
(1) Business Week, September 9, 1939, p. 58
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iron and steel products, and sewing machines, Peru
imported $12, 000,000 worth of German rayon goods, metal
and wood furniture, paints, household drug supplies,
sporting goods, musical instruments, and tools. Since the
United States was already in the Latin American market for
everything from textiles to sewing machines and since there
was not shortage of cargo ships, there seemed to be no good
reason why we could not sell all these products to the
Latins. (1)
The figures for our Latin American trade during
the first world war gave us further reason to believe that
we were going to have a trade boom with the southern
countries. Our exports to Latin America increased from
$279,362,000 in 1914 to $1,488,324,000 in 1920, or an
increase of about 432^. Imports in the same period increased
from $467,946,000 to $1,766,078,000, or an increase of
about 277%, (2) It should be noted that although our exports
increased at a faster rate than our imports, there was still
a favorable balance of trade on the side of Latin America.
Also it should be noted that on a dollar value basis our
imports increased by $1,298,132,000 as compared to an
increase of $1,208,962,000 for our exports. We left the
Latins plenty of exchange with which to buy American goods.
(1) Management Review, December 16, 1939, p. 416
Business Week, September 16, 1939, p. 53
(2) Hoyt, K. , Op. Cit., p. 661
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There is no doubt that predictions in regard to
our increased exports have come true. Exports to twenty
Latin .American republics were up 50$ for the first year
of the war. This increase represented a total value of
#733,135,000 for September 1939 to September 1940 as com-
pared to the equivalent period ending August 31, 1939.
The chief reason for this increase in our exports was that
the intensive maritime blockade put on by Britain and the
subjection to war of many countries of Europe practically
eliminated the Continent as a source of supply to the
Latins. The fact that Europe, exclusive of Great Britain
and Ireland, normally furnish 34.1/° of Latin American
imports illustrates the degree to which the Latin countries
have been forced to turn to the United States for their
purchases. Our animal and vegetable products, including
lard, dairy products, leather, flour, potatoes, barley,
hops, automobile tires and other rubber manufactures, and
naval stores showed a gain of 26.4$ to Latin America in the
first year of the war. Textile fibers and manufactures
increased 46.7$; wood and paper products, 79.2$; bituminous
coal and petroleum v/ere up 49.2$; our metals and manufac-
tures industry exports were up 131$; machinery and vehicle
exports plus aircraft, agricultural implements, and railroad
rolling stock increased 21.8$; chemicals and related products
increased 80$. This great diversification of our exports
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and the large increase in them demonstrate our capacity to
provide for most of the Latin American wants without any
great effort. (1)
Not only were the Latins unable to buy in European
markets; they also were unable to sell there, meaning that
new buyers must be found for $525,573,000 worth of raw
products, or 28.6$ of the normal exports of the Latin
American nations. We have not been so successful in devel-
oping an outlet in this country for these surplus Latin
American products as we have been in supplying her needs,
although our imports have shown a marked increase. In the
twelve months from September 1939 to September 1940 our
imports from Latin America increased from $468,999,000 for
the twelve months ending August 1939 to $615,915,000, or a
little over 31$, for the same period ending in 1940.
Vegetable food products and beverages constituted slightly
more than half of the value of our total imports for the
latter year and showed an increase of 14/b over the previous
year. Imports of textile fibers and manufactures were up
140$, mostly due to wool. Inedible animal products were up
63$. (2) It should be noted that our imports exceeded our
(1) Reprint from Foreign Commerce Weekly , U. S. Dept, of
C ommerce, October 12, 1940
Thomas, E.
,
"America’s Trade in a Ohanging World,"
National Foreign Trade Council
,
October 29, 1940, p. 2
Crawford,' L.
,
"Americans Foreign Trade in the First Year
of the War," National Foreign Trade Council
,
October 31,
1940, pp. 5-9
(2) Crawford, L. , Op. Clt., pp. 5-11
Thomas, L.
,
Op. Cit., p. 2
Foreign Commerce Weekly, Op. Cit.
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imports by $117,220,000 and. thereby demonstrated that the
results of this war could not be judged by the last war,
for during the last war Latin America had a favorable
balance of trade with the United States and, consequently,
had plenty of exchange with which to buy from us. This
problem of exchange proved a serious stumbling block to
our trade relations with Latin America during the war as
the next chapter will explain.
•/ '
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CHAPTER IX
WE BEGIN TO FACE EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES
It is a well-known Tact that no nation can think
only in terms of selling, for the essence of foreign trade
is that a nation in the long run can not sell more than it
buys unless it is willing to leave the difference with its
customers as investments or donations. Therefore, before
we can sell to the Latins an additional amount of merchan-
dise equal to that formerly supplied by Germany, we must
first take the warring nation’s place in buying; or we can
take the precarious way of lending them money to buy from
us. A third way that might make a little exchange available
is the creation of a three-way business by which Latin
America would sell to Europe and use the proceeds for pur-
chases in the United States. (1)
This third method of creating funds with which
the Latins might buy American products during the war has
been a major disappointment, for due to German victories
and the British blockade European markets are necessarily
closed to the entrance of Latin American goods. The effect
of the Latins' loss of their European market was felt upon
our trade with the southern countries as early as May, 1940.
A report in that month stated that "because of lost
Til Inman , S. G. , "Planning Pan-American Trade," Harvard
Business Review
,
Winter Number, 1939-40, p. 147
Reprint from The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, National City Bank ,
Bept. 1940
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European markets and exchange difficulties, the rate of
growth (in trade) since the war has already slowed down
and, according to foreign traders, will die out entirely
unless some plan for stimulating trade is worked out."(l)
Besides the loss of a market that bought about $600,000,000
worth of products annually, the Latins lose approximately
another $300,000,000 worth of exchange because of England’s
wartime clearing agreement whereby all sterling exchange
is blocked for purchases of goods in England. (2) In other
words, as far as obtaining exchange with which to buy from
us is concerned, the Latins have definitely suffered as a
result of the war.
The expedient of granting loans to the southern
countries to tide them over until better times has been
resorted to principally through the Export-Import Bank.
This bank was formed in 1934 in order to aid in financing
and to help facilitate imports and exports. Its activities
have been principally related to Latin America. In Septem-
ber of 1940 Congress passed a bill that greatly increased
the role of the bank in developing our Latin American trade.
The bank's capital was increased from $200,000,000 to
$700,000,000 with the object of assisting "in the development
(1) The Hew York Times, May 12, 1940, p. P-7
(2) Address by Nelson Rockefeller at Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,
N.Y.City, Oct. 15, 1940, "Office for Coordination of
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American
Republics" Business Week
,
Jan. 11, 1941, p. 56
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of the resources, the stabilization of the economies, and
the orderly marketing of the products of the countries of
the Western Hemisphere . ” (1 ) Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Chile, and several of the smaller countries have received
loans from the bank in line with our government's policy
of bolstering the economies of countries whose normal com-
merce has suffered from the war* Argentina has been given
the largest loan, a total of $50,000,000 from the Export-
Import Bank since June of 1940* The latter country has
received a total loan from the United States Government
of $110,000,000, but $60,000,000 of it was loaned from
the Treasury Department's stabilization fund - a departure
from the original concept of the fund, which was to stabi-
lize the currencies of Britain and France in relation to
the dollar. (2)
The loans solve the problem of exchange temporar-
ily, but leave Latin American countries under the necessity
of finding the dollar exchange with which to meet the pay-
ments as they fall due, so that the Latins either have to
borrow more money from us or else export more to us. We can
say, then, that loans do not create new sources of exchange
supply. An exception to this statement may be loans that
are used to build equipment - such as, highways, railroads,
and factories - that eventually contribute to the amount of
(1) McCullock, J. I. B., Op. Git.
(2) Business Week, December 14, 1940, p. 62
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products that can be exported and thereby add to the
supply of foreign exchange. An example of such a loan
would be one that helped finance the proposed railroad con-
necting Santos, Brazil, with Arica, Chile. Such a road
would provide an opening on the Atlantic for Bolivian oil
and tin and would make available rich deposits of gold,
iron, manganese, platinum, diamonds, and sapphires .( 1
)
The bank has declared that its policy is to put emphasis
on increasing the productive capacity of the countries to
which it grants loans. Loans to Brazil for the purchase
of railroad equipment, to Haiti for "farm-to-market roads,"
and to Chile for a highway between two important cities
are examples of the sort of development loans that have
been made by the bank. (2) To what extent the bank will be
forced to yield to political pressure and grant loans to
be used for unproductive purposes we have no way of knowing.
The first way we mentioned to provide the Latins
with foreign exchange - increasing our buying from the
southern countries - has already taken place to a certain
extent as we have already seen in the last chapter. But
our buying has not increased enough to justify our greatly
increased exports. It will be remembered that we now have
a favorable balance of trade with Latin America and thereby
(1 ) Business Week, January 25, 1941, pp. 54 and 55
(2) McCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., p. 53
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do not provide them with enough dollar exchange with which
to pay for all of their imports from this country. There
is a good chance that this situation will be remedied some
time in the future, however, for work is being done on all
sides to try to increase our imports from Latin America.
Our government has an Office for the Coordination of
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American
Republics that is trying to increase our imports. It has
recently planned to establish in each Latin American capi-
tal a Merchandising Advisory Service for the benefit of
producers and exporters in all Latin American countries .( 1
)
Another kind of agency that is trying to increase
our imports from Latin America is the Inter—American Econom-
ic Committee which was set up by the Latin American republics
for the purpose of collecting information and seeking
remedies for trade and financial dislocations due to the
war. This committee has been meeting in Washington trying
to increase Latin American exports to this country and
building up industries in the southern countries. Before
this committee a Latin American enumerated more than fifty
products which could be marketed in the United States
without competition from domestic sources. He also pointed
to many articles formerly from Czechoslovakia, Germany,
(1 ) Business Week, February 22, 1941, p. 67
*.
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Austria, and Poland which can be manufactured at the same
cost, quality, and quantity in Latin America. (1)
As an example of the activity of private inter-
ests in increasing our imports from Latin America we have
the proposed exhibition in New York of fifty tons of
Brazilian merchandise samples. Mr. de Botelho, a New York
businessman and the initiator of the exhibit, has already
purchased his samples and is awaiting their arrival. (2)
Joseph Lurrell, the senior vice-president of the National
City Bank, cites an example that shows our banks are also
helping to develop trade. The example is of a man in
South America who by the aid of a bank loan was encouraged
to establish a thriving business supplying the United
States with a widely used product formerly obtained in
China. (3)
It is too early to give any clear picture of the
success that these agencies have had in increasing our
imports from Latin America, although there is a large
amount of evidence to prove that headway is being made.
Below we present some of the reports that compose this
evidence.
(1 ) Stern, P. M. , "The War and Latin America," Bankers
Magazine
,
Feb. 1940, p. 197
(2) Business Week, Feb. 22, 1941, p. 97
(3) Durreil, S., "Financing Latin American Trade,"
Burroughs Clearing House
, April 1940 , p. 12
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In November, 1940, we heard that cheese of all
kinds from Latin America had been introduced on a large
scale to the American market.
"Gruyere, Parmesan, Limburger, Tilsit, Holanda,
Sbrinz, Romano, Gouda, Reggiano, and 'Danish
blue-type' cheese are all produced in the Argen-
tine and Brazil markets and are finding an
expanding market in the United States. Imports
of blue cheese from the Argentine jumped from
313 pounds in 1939 to 123,908 pounds in Septem-
ber of 1940. ... During August (1940) a total of
434,570 pounds of Argentine cheeses of all types
entered the United States."
The reason for the increased imports is that the European
suppliers have been excluded from the United States mar-
kets because of the war. Most of the increases in our
imports from Latin America are expected to survive the
war
.
( 1
)
A report in October, 1940 stated that efforts
are being made to increase our imports of manioc from
Brazil. We now import most of this product, used in
plastics, tapioca, and adhesives, from the Dutch East
Indies
.
"If research seeking expanded uses for manioc is
successful, Brazil's enormous potential produc-
tion may one day provide a source of foreign
exchange that will compensate for that country's
loss to the Dutch East Indies of most of the
world's rubber markets."
The principal fault that American manufacturers have found
with the Brazilian product has been its lack of
standardization. (2)
(1
)
Business Week, November 9, 1940, p. 60
(2) Business Week, October 19, 1940, p. 65
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A report of December 14, 1940 announced that
the first sizeable shipment of Argentine champagne ever
consigned to the United states market arrived in New York
in time for the holiday trade.
"Nearly 6,000 cases were unloaded ... and 12,000
additional cases of Argentine sparkling Burgundy,
champagne, and Bordeaux-type wines will be in
the hands of dealers as far west as C hicago and
Houston before the end of the year. ... A per-
manent trade in Argentine wines is expected to
develop • . . Vermouth salesmen from the Argentine
were said to have received orders for 310,000
cases, with deliveries to begin in January. "(1)
Another item in November stated a number of new
products were coming into the United States from Latin
America; Brazilian pineapples that come into season just
about the time that the Hawaiian variety goes out, hams
from Uruguay said to be comparable to the famous Polish
product, fresh fruit that has a different season from
ours, pears, grapes, tomato paste, and extra-large fancy
apples
. (2)
Other products reported to be coming from Latin
America include vegetable oils, glycerine, rock crystal,
mica, ores and minerals - all of which were formerly
obtained in other parts of the world. (3)
A late report announces that the Argentines have
found a way to get around our quarantine ruling against
(1 ) Business Week, December 14, 1940
(2) Business Week, November 16, 1940, p. 67
(3) The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, February 6, 1941
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their beef and are now supplying several restaurants in
New York • ( 1
)
No one new import from Latin America will make
any appreciable difference in the Latins’ unfavorable
balance of trade with us, but when they are taken all
together and when the number of new products increases, a
greatly eased situation should result in regard to their
foreign exchange problem. The least that can be said is
that we are taking steps in the right direction.
Recent developments seem to indicate that our
government is modifying its plans to increase our pur-
chases from Latin America in order to include and safe-
guard economic interests of Great Britain. For example,
we are not taking all of Bolivia’s tin ore because British
interests want to continue to smelt it at home after the
war and get the usual refiner’3 profits. (2) We ultimately
buy half of the world’s tin. Another example is that we
allowed Brazil to underbid us on a cotton sale to Canada
because it was to the interest of Britain that Canada con-
serve her dollar exchange for purchases of arms and war
materials in this country. In this way we helped Britain
and Brazil and left ourselves in the middle. A further
TTj Bus’iness Week, February 22, 1941, p. 68
(2) Business Week, March 8, 1941, p. 31
If we bought all our tin from Bolivia instead of buy-
ing from the Anglo-Dutch monopoly, we could create
70 to 100 million dollars of exchange for Bolivia.
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example Is that we have allowed the British to store wool
here in spite of the fact that the Argentines can not be
induced to raise this kind of wool, which we must import,
while there is this backlog of the Australian product
stored here.(l) It seems that we will have to do some
very fancy juggling if we want to combine all of our
interests and still come out somewhere near the top.
The passage of the Lease-Lend Bill by Congress
recently is apt to be a threat to the success of all the
agencies working in behalf of increased imports from Latin
America - in fact, to the whole future of our Latin American
trade. The reason for this is that our government officials,
full of zeal to help Britain, may feel compelled to divert
some of our shipping from Latin America in order to make
more vessels available for shipments of arms to the
English. The latter are hard pressed for ships and are
exerting pressure upon the United States to transfer ships
from the American merchant marine to them. We now have a
merchant marine fleet of 1300 vessels, which number is con-
sidered rock bottom to care for our shipping interests
.
(2)
If we transfer any of these ships without replacing them by
new ones, our trade with Latin America will have to suffer,
and we may find out later that we have lost our big chance
(1 ) Business Week, January 11, 1941, p. 50
(2) The Boston Globe, December 11, 1940
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to increase commercial relations with our sister republics.
Even now we have evidence that there is a shortage of
vessels to care for our Latin American trade. A certain
American importer is reported forced to wait for the
arrival of his products here because of the shortage of
northbound shipping space, caused by the commandeering of
space by Washington for bulky stragegic materials
.
(1
)
( 1 ) Bus iness Week, February 22, 1941, p. 67
,
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CHAPTER X
SURPLUS PRODUCTS
The loss of European markets to the Latins did
not concern us merely because our ability to sell was
restricted by Latin America’s inability to buy* Our
chief concern was that Europe’s decreased buying power
caused huge quantities of surplus products to pile up in
the southern countries. These surpluses brought with
them serious problems, for most of the Latin countries
have built their whole economies around two or three
staple commodities and are, therefore, vitally dependent
upon their export markets. The economic dislocation
caused by this dependence upon the export markets could
cause political upheaval which would seriously impair our
access to vital Latin American raw materials. Bolivian
peons, discontented with economic distress, could con-
ceivably stage a revolt and thereby cut ns off from
Bolivia's tin supply.
P’urthermore, an even greater danger looms in the
background. If Germany conquered England and found the
Latins with such large surpluses that they would be willing
to take almost any offer to sell them, how could we reason-
ably keep Germany out of the market? Ordinarily, we would
have no good reason to keep German trade out of the southern
countries, but since experience has shown that economic
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penetration on the part of Germany is generally followed
by military penetration and political ties, we do not
feel that we can stand by and forfeit Latin America to the
Nazis
.
(l)
There have been two plans put forward to deal
with the problem of the surpluses. One is the "cartel"
idea of the "hemispheric solidarity" plan and the other
is the quota system.
The cartel idea was announced last June after
France had fallen and England seemed to have only a few
more hours as a world power. The plan was rushed out
quickly before it could be studied and its weaknesses
ironed out. (2) According to the plan, the United States
would buy up all surplus commodities through an "inter-
American body" and thus be in a position of forcing
Germany to deal through a central agency rather than let-
ting her approach individual countries and thereby exert
pressure to obtain unfair advantages. If the surpluses
we bought could not be sold, they would be burned; and the
cost would be written off to national defense.
The argument may sound good on the surface, but
there are serious obstacles standing in its way. The
expense alone would be enormous. In addition, what is
going to keep the Latins from increasing their production
(1 ) ivicCullock, J. I. B. , Op. Git., pp. 44-46
(2) Business Week, January 11, 1941, p. 50
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and thus increasing the expense of the cartel? Some kind
of strict control would be needed, and even then there is
no assurance that the control would be successful, for
crop control has not been a success even in our own coun-
try. Furthermore, American farmers are skeptical lest the
surpluses would compete with their goods. The Latins are
afraid that after we bought up their products, a different
administration might come into power and dump the products
on the market, thereby depressing prices to ruinous levels.
As a result, the Latins’ economies would be in chaos. (1)
Our comment is that the plan is an ambitious project but
one that is likely to cause great dissatisfaction to tax-
payers who are getting tired of paying for cotton bonfires
and hogs that are not raised.
The cartel plan was shelved before the Havana
Conference and no concerted attempt has been made to bring
it into actual operation. It is possible that it was not
seriously considered by our government but was merely used
as a warning to Hitler. If the latter is the case, the
warning had its effect for Germany became very much
alarmed. (2)
The other plan for dealing with Latin America’s
surpluses is different from the cartel plan in that it
does not attempt to control the sale of all surplus products
ID McCuilock, J. I. B. , Op. Cit., op. 46-47
(2) business Week, January 11, 1941, p. 53
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but simply regulate the price and the quantity of the
products sold in the United States. A plan of this sort
is expected to maintain a price that is not consistent
with the supply of the products available and to regulate
the amounts that each country can sell here in order that
one country will not drive the price down by competing
with other countries. The first product to have a quota
system was coffee. Under the system there is a control
committee composed of representatives from fourteen Latin
American countries and a representative from the United
States to safeguard this country against runaway prices.
The hope of the committee is to hold shipments to the
United States at a normal level of about 15,000,000 bags
a year. As a result of the program, coffee prices jumped
more than two cents a pound. Negotiations are now going
on (February) to put cocoa on a quota system also, and it
is expected that the Latins will appeal for aid in handling
surpluses of wool, wheat, corn, cotton, and meat.(l)
If the quota system is deemed necessary for
national defense, the cost of it can be justified and con-
sidered as a special defense tax upon the consumers of the
quota products. Or if it is just a temporary means of
helping a sick neighbor, we might consider the plan as
worth its cost as a builder of goodwill providing it is
administered in such a way that we do not appear too much
(l ) Business Week, October 5, 1940, p. 63
Ibid, February 22, 1940, p. 62
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like a buyer who pleads to be charged a higher price than
the salesman is asking. We must keep our dignity or else
we will be just paying a higher price for our products
and getting nothing in return.
If the quota system is considered as a long-term
plan rather than as a temporary expedient, it is apt to be
very detrimental to the development of our Latin American
trade, for an artificial price upon commodities will
encourage their production on an uneconomic basis and
thereby prevent productive energy from finding economically
justified outlets. In this way we will always be dealing
with surpluses, and producers will have no incentive to
turn to the production of other goods. An alternative
viev; to this one is that the quota system may have the
effect of bringing about a gradual and orderly decrease of
production of surplus products, because the individual
Countries, seeing that they can sell only a certain amount
of quota products, will cease producing an amount above
this figure and turn to the production of other products.
In either case, the people of this country pay the cost.
..
.
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CHAPTER XI
CULTURAL RELATIONS
Cultural contacts with Latin America are
enormously important because unless we have an understand
ing of the customs and philosophy of the people of a
foreign country, we are not likely to create the kind of
feelings that promote friendly political relations and
consequently the kind of relations that promote trade.
Mutual understanding and confidence are fundamentals that
we must not ignore.
The government took the lead in improving our
cultural relations in 1938 by setting up a Livision of
Cultural Relations in the State Department .( 1 ) The Divi-
sion held four conferences in the fall of 1939 on inter-
American relations in the field of art, music, education,
and publications, to which important people flocked from
all over the country and at which useful ideas fairly
burgeoned. Lut all of the ideas involved money and there
v/as very little forthcoming. Besides the lack of money
there were all sorts of restrictions put on the Division
in order to keep it from functioning as a high pressure
propaganda agency such as the Nazis have in Latin America
(1) Most of the material in this chapter is taken from
Hanke, L.
,
’’Plain Speaking about Latin America,”
Harpers, November 1940, pp. 588-596
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Another agency set up by the government has not
been any more successful. The Inter-Departmental Committee
on Cooperation with the American Republics was established
at about the same time as trie Division of Cultural Rela-
tions. Its purpose was to enable the various government
agencies (Smithsonian Institute, Department of the Interior,
Tariff Commission, Maritime Commission, Federal Works
Agency, Civil Aeronautics Authority, Department of Justice,
Public Health Service, Department of Labor, Department of
Commerce, and Library of Commerce) to work out a general
program for improving relations with Latin America. A
million dollar plan was drawn up, but at the last moment
it was decided to make each agency present separately its
ov/n part of the proposed program in its own deficiency bill.
This had the effect of killing the bill and disintegrating
the solid front.
Last fall Nelson Rockefeller accepted the posi-
tion of Co-ordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations
between the American Republics and it was hoped and
expected at the time that he would put new life into the
movement. It is too soon to judge the results of
Rockefeller's efforts. He is planning an extensive adver-
tising campaign in the Latin countries in order to induce
the Latins to come to the United States and get acquainted.
He has organized a bureau to welcome the visitors and help
t.
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them arrange travel facilities . (1 ) The commercial rela-
tions are so serious, as we have seen, that perhaps he has
not had much time to devote to the cultural side.
The entrance of private interests and foundations
into the Latin American cultural field has been a disappoint-
ment in most instances. The Guggenheim and the Kockefeller
Foundations are notable exceptions, but their work is in
health, and the social sciences. The humanities are
neglected. The reasons for this may be that the private
foundations in this country feel that there is too much
politics involved, that we do not have the personnel to
carry on Latin American work, or that the Latin American
institutions do not show enough promise of survival to
justify support. But whatever the reasons, Latin America
still remains one of the great relatively virgin areas
awaiting scholarly investigations.
Recently the motion picture industry has been
encouraged to produce more Latin American pictures as a
means of furthering goodwill in the Latin countries. But
it is said that the moving pictures thus far have brought
about more ill feeling and misunderstanding than anything
else. A case in point is the picture about Juarez. This
picture misrepresents Latin American history and thereby
contributes to resentment and misunderstanding. To the
TTT Business Week, February 22, 1941, p. 68
News Week, November 11, 1940, p. 47
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people of Latin America the outgrowth of the motion picture
is a conception of the United States as a people living in
materialism without spiritual guidance. They picture the
United States as a place of business and advertising, of
perpetual motion and artificiality, and consequently they
are undermining any rational conception of the country as
Christian. (1
)
In the same category as the motion pictures we
have the radio. The broadcasting interests in this country
are making American programs available to larger Latin
audiences than ever before by the construction and opera-
tion of new stations in this country and by the formation
of a chain of local stations in the southern countries
.
(2
)
The value of the radio depends upon the success the broad-
casting companies have producing the kind of programs that
are inducive to creating good feeling toward the United
States
•
The newspapers are not the goodwill workers that
they might be either. They may help by sending honest
news to the Latin American countries and thereby thwarting
the untruths of the Nazis, but they certainly do not help
Americans to understand the culture of the Latins. We hear
much about Nazis in Latin America and Hitler’s designs upon
(1) McGuire, C., "Resentment as the Sanction of an Age,"
Catholic Alumni Sodality Letter
,
Boston, March 15, 1941
(2) Business Y/eek, Jan. 4, 1941, ~p. 44
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the countries, but we rarely hear anything about the
every day activities of the Latins that would help us to
understand their customs, ideals, and thoughts. Also,
this emphasis on the Nazi menace is apt to make the Latins
feel that cultural work is merely a subterfuge to get
naval bases or to thwart Hitler’s agents and not a genuine
movement to get acquainted.
In our criticisms of the cultural relations work
we should be fair-minded enough to realize that developing
understanding between peoples that are so widely diverse
in their cultures and backgrounds as are the Latin nations
and the United States is not a job that can be accomplished
overnight. We must be patient and persevering. In the
end, perhaps after generations, we probably can create
better understanding and then we can feel that all of our
efforts have been well rewarded
;.
.
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CHAPTER XII
THE FUTURE: INDUSTRIALIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA
The preceding chapters of this paper have been
concerned principally with the development of our trade
with Latin America from 1933 to the present. We turn now
to a survey of the factors that are likely to influence our
future trade with the southern countries. The first of
these factors is the industrialization of Latin America.
The industrialization of Latin America began
in about 1880 on a small scale. Its growth has been
fostered by a natural mechanical ability of the Latin pop-
ulation, by huge reserves of raw materials, and by an
abundance of water power. The drawbacks have been the
lack of coal; a small population; a relative shortage of
capital; and preferences on the part of the population for
land owning, politics, and professions rather than for
industry. These drawbacks have been partly offset in
recent years by various new factors, namely the increased
population, efforts to increase the standard of living of
the people, the growth of nationalism and business spirit,
and revolutionary technological changes profoundly affect-
ing the basis of industrialism.
In the future the growth of transportation facil-
ities and the increased populations will supply larger mar-
kets and larger industries. Today the various countries
and parts of countries are largely split up into units with
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small populations and with no transportation connections.
The result is that the market either prohibits industries
altogether or else limits them to the manufacture of
articles that have an optimum point of production consis-
tent with a small output. It is evident that industries
with high fixed costs cannot operate under this set-up,
but articles requiring a minimum of fixed costs and a
maximum of variable costs should be able to prosper. We
find that this is the actual case, for the Latins are
active in the manufacture of food preparations, beverages,
animal by-products, cotton cloth, knit goods, shoes, hats,
furniture, printing, pottery, glassware, pharmaceuticals,
soap and ceramics, building materials, cigarettes, woolen
goods, beer, leather, and iron and steel products on a
small scale, (1) Practically all of the products are the
sort that can be expected in the primary stages of indus-
trialization, Their manufacture is relatively simple and
the fixed costs are small. As yet the Latins are not able
to satisfy all of their needs in any of these fields, but
they can be expected to be able to do so in the future.
Before the industrialization process can advance at a rapid
pace, the scarcity of capital will have to be remedied. In
this connection the Latins should take steps to place their
credit on a strong basis in order to be able to attract
American capital,
(l) Wythe, d., "The New Industrialization of Latin America, 11
Journal of Political Economy
,
April 1937, p. 216
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As far as can be determined, right now, the most
probable effect that this industrialization will have
upon our exports is merely to change their character.
Experience shows that this is the effect that it has had
upon our exports to Latin America in the past. In 1889,
breadstuff s and provisions, together with such natural
resources as lumber and petroleum, comprised the great
bulk of United States exports to Latin America. By 1938
only 10$ of total volume consisted of foodstuffs while 51$
consisted of manufactures. ( 1 ) The fact that Latin America
lacks sufficient coal and other materials for the produc-
tion of heavy steel production is another reason for
believing that the character of our exports will be changed
rather than the volume* The Latins, unable to produce their
own heavy steel manufactures, will manufacture only consumer
goods and will turn to us for heavy producers’ goods. In
this way we can supply the Latins with road building machi-
nery, the steel for bridges, cars and engines, heavy indus-
trial machinery, and electrical equipment. The last reason
for believing that merely the character of our exports will
change is that as the Latins’ standard of living rises we
can expect to increase our sales of sporting goods, radios,
moving pictures, and other luxuries outside the realm of
the easily manufactured or necessary articles such as the
Latins are concentrating on now. It is complexity that
( 1 ) Wythe , Or. , "Fifty Years of Inter-American Trade,"
Pan-American bulletin, April 1940, p. 281
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creates needs and markets; our trade with highly indus-
trialized Britain is ordinarily larger than with any other
country, not in spite of the fact that "both countries are
highly industrialized, but because they are highly indus-
trialized. There will be a great deal more complexity in
the Latins’ economies as their manufactures increase and
as their social programs raise the standard of living of
the populations.
It is possible that the industrialization of
Latin America will solve the problem of surplus products.
If the Latin countries are able to increase their manufac-
tures, a large part of the productive activity used in the
production of raw materials can be put to work manufactur-
ing goods for which there is a ready market. In this way
Argentina could conceivably increase her manufactures and
at the same time decrease her production of surplus products
such as wheat. An alternative to having the surplus problem
solved by greater diversification in each country would be
to have some countries continue to produce their surplus
goods but to have other Latin nations manufacture them.
In other words, the economy of the Latin American countries
as a whole would be diversified, but specialization would be
found in practically every country. As examples of this
alternative, Argentina could exchange her surplus wheat
with Chile for copper manufactures made out of surplus
Chilean copper. Brazil could manufacture her surplus cotton
..
.
V
.
1 •
'
.
-86 -
and exchange the cloth for Mexican shoes made out of surplus
Latin American hides. Venezuela would find a larger market
for her petroleum and petroleum products as a result of the
grov/th of industrialization. These cases are only an illus-
tration of what might be expected. The disposal of the
surplus products would run hand in hand with the satisfac-
tion of a large part of the Latins’ requirements for
manufactured products.
The greater diversification of Latin America’s
economy on the whole ‘Linder the above scheme would help
stabilize the economies of the individual countries and put
them on a strong bargaining basis in case of a German vic-
tory in Surope. With their present dependence upon a few
staple commodities for export, the Latins are in a poor
condition to refuse any sort of a Hitler bid to relieve
them of their surpluses. With the development of home mar-
kets this dependence would not exist.
There is a possibility that the nationalism of
the southern countries, as can be witnessed by the tariffs
to aid domestic manufacturing, will lead the individual
countries into an effort to attain self-sufficiency and
thereby decrease the amount of trade that we can do with
them. One reason for doubting the fulfillment of this
possibility is that the extremely high prices that would
follow are contradictory to the Latins’ policy of keeping
prices within the reach of the purchasing power of the
people in order to help raise their standard of living.
.' ;•
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Mexico recently lowered her tariff barriers at the expense
of her domestic manufactures in order to lower prices.
Further reasons why efforts for self-sufficiency are not
likely to be made are, first, the Latin countries have
such an obvious advantage in the production of raw materials
that self-sufficiency would be extremely unprofitable, and,
second, Latin America is composed of several countries that
have no solid basis for cooperation and none of which has
sufficient resources of its own to become self-sufficient.
Recently the claim has often been put forward
that industrialization of Latin America will enable the
southern countries to obtain a large amount of exchange
with which to buy more products from the United States.
By continuing to export raw materials that are essential
to the rest of the world the Latins are expected to main-
tain their export markets but are expected to decrease
their imports by producing at home a large part of their
requirements for manufactured goods. The result of such a
condition would be an increased favorable balance of trade
for the Latins which would be available for purchases in
the United States. This claim is shortsighted, for it is
evident that this whole hemisphere cannot continue indefi-
nitely to have a favorable balance of trade in its rela-
tions with the rest of the world unless it is willing to
allow the excess of exports over imports to be considered
a gift to the rest of the world. If we are to increase
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oup trade with Latin America in this way, we must he pre-
pared to increase our purchases from the rest of the world
in order to restore its unfavorable balance of trade with
Latin America. Furthermore, the use of blocked currencies,
which can logically be expected in a post-war bankrupt
world, will restrict the Latins’ purchases to countries
which buy in Latin America.
A factor that is likely to impede the progress of
industrialization in Latin America is the poor credit
rating of many of the southern countries. United States
citizens had invested in South American bonds in 1939 a
par value of $963,000,000, an amount larger than that
invested in any other geographic area except Canada. Of
this large amount, 70% was in default. The income received
from the United States holdings of South American bonds
during 1938 was only 1.1% of par value, a low as compared
with other bonds throughout the world. The experience
with Central -America is equally dismal, but the amount is
comparatively small. It is hardly conceivable that Americans
are going to be induced to invest further in Latin America
until existing debts are honored. (1) The present credit
rating of the Latin countries can be determined by observ-
ing quotations on their bonds. These quotations run all the
way from 7% to about 80$ of the par value of the bonds. (2)
(1 ) Koyt , K. , Op. Cit., p. 661
(2) The Boston Herald, March 12, 1941
.,
.
.
.
'
V
. I,
• • • t
-89 -
At present there seems to prevail a hope that
industrialization can he used as part of a method to
develop a self-sufficient hemisphere. Since the develop-
ment of the resources of Latin America also plays a part
in this plan, we will pass over for the time being the
question of a self-sufficient hemisphere.
.
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CHAPTER XIII
THE FUTURE: DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN RESOURCES
The second factor that is likely to influence the
future of our Latin American trade is the development of the
natural resources of the southern countries. This factor
is closely connected with the problem of increasing our
imports from Latin America, for by developing in Latin
America adequate production of materials which we ordinarily
buy elsewhere, we can supply the Latins with more foreign
exchange with which to buy more goods from us.
In an earlier chapter we mentioned some of the
results of the efforts that have been made to increase our
imports from Latin America. The success that has been
achieved is spectacular, but by no means has the list of
possible imports from Latin America been exhausted. Looking
at the following chart we find that, with the exception of
sugar, nuts, waxes, oils, tin and cacao, Latin America can
meet all our import requirements of the products listed.
Yet in no case do we purchase all of our needs for these
products in the southern countries. The reason why we buy
elsewhere is often a mere matter of lack of standardization
of the product, poor transportation facilities, or some
other factor that could be overcome with the proper techni-
cal direction. If we could succeed in developing the
resources of Latin America in regard to just these products.
o. .
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CHART V
EXPORTS OF TWENTY LEADING COMMODITIES FROM
TWENTY REPUBLICS OP' LATIN AMERICA
Countries of Destination
(thousands of dollars)
U. S. Imports Per Cent of
Commodity
Value to
All Other
Countries
from Other
Than Twenty
Latin American
Republics
Imports from
Latin America
to U.S. Total
Imports
Petroleum 280,554 20,429 51.7
Coffee 99,968 4,009 2.9
Meats 118,389 20,252 68.1
Sugar 32,322 50,702 38.9
Copper 69,799 10,957 30.4
Wool 85,047 14,839 65.6
Cotton 74,955 7,205 74.9
Metals, other
than copper and
tin 42,285 20,722 61.1
Hides and skins 47,598 20,092 67.2
Whe at 61,438 2,542 99.9
Linseed 44,224 218 1.1
Corn
Nuts, waxes, oils
59,299
>
26 10.1
etc
.
18,090 79,635 83.0
Nitrate 18,887 43 0.4
Cereals, except
wheat, corn.
linseed 29,743 4,244 99.4
Bananas 5,890 10 0.03
Tin 24,392 44,400 98.9
Cabinet woods,
lumber and
quebracho 16 , 618 17,353 78.3
Cacao 7,208 8,031 39.9
Fibers (henequen.
etc
.
)
3,429 69,094 93.0
U.S. total imports
from other coun-
tries 394,803
Latin American Section, Division of Regional
Information, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Department of Commerce
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the Latins would have an additional $394,000,000 of
exchange with which to buy more products from us. Proper
technical assistance, both government and private, should
be instrumental in obtaining for the Latins part of this
sp394, 000, 000 in the future.
Besides these products which the Latins are now
producing in sufficient quantities to satisfy all our
requirements, there are other products which they could
eventually produce enough of to satisfy all our wants.
Three cases in point are rubber, quinine, and coconuts.
For centuries Latin America was the natural habitat of the
first two of these products, but recently plantations for
growing them have been developed in other parts of the
world with Latin American stock, and they have succeeded
in driving the American product out of the market. The
third product, coconuts, is extremely adaptable to produc-
tion in Latin America, but in spite of that we import most
of our coconuts and coconut products from other sources.
In these products and in others such as aboca and kapok,
the superior methods of production that have been achieved
the old world can easily be adopted in the Latin American
countries with a little help on our part. (1) There is a
third group of commodities that can also help swell our
imports from Latin America. This group consists of products
(l ) Wilson, C. M., "Buy Hemisphere Products," Harpers, Jan. 1940,
pp. 147-155
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that we import from the southern countries in small quanti-
ties, but production of which could be increased enough to
satisfy all our needs. These products, not listed on the
chart of the twenty leading commodities of Latin American
exports, consist principally of pyrethrum, industrial dia-
monds, chromite, platinum, manganese, iron, and vanilla
beans. George Wythe, an authority on Latin American trade,
estimates that we can increase imports of products in all
three groups combined by about ^200,000,000 above 1936-38
trade figures. (1)
The present search for sources of strategic
national defense materials is apt to cause in the near
future aggressive action on the part of our government in
developing Latin American resources. The southern countries
already have available five of the strategic materials listed
by the Army and Navy Munitions Board as being products "for
which strict conservation and distribution control measures
will be necessary.' 1 These five products are antimony,
manganese, mercury, quartz crystal, and tungsten. There
are possibilities of developing supplies from Latin America
of several other of the fourteen strategic materials. They
are mica, chromium, coconut shell char, manila fiber,
quinine, and rubber. The last three of these products would
take some time to develop and would not be available for
TT) Wythe , G. , "The New Industrialization of Latin .America",
Op, Cit., pp. 207-223
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any immediate crisis in sufficient quantities for all our
needs. (1)
It is practically a certainty that the rich
resources of the southern countries will eventually he
developed. A plum so rich and juicy as Latin America
cannot escape for long the notice and avarice of the
world. If we wish to be in on the feast, we should start
preparing for it now. An army of technicians and a v/ealth
of capital must be sent to the southern countries imme-
diately to start developments before other countries can
get a foothold. To reap the gains of our labor in trade,
we must conclude trade agreements that will serve to
guarantee us larger markets in Latin America as our pur-
chases there increase. The trade agreements should also
serve to give the Latins enough confidence to make long-
term committments in developing their resources.
( 1 ) Foreign Policy Reports , August 1, 1940, August 1, 1939
.
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CHAPTER XIV
THE FUTURE: A SELF-SUFFICIENT HEMISPHERE
Since the war in Europe has begun, an opinion
seems to have grown among the people of this country that
the desired effect of our commercial relations with Latin
America is to bring about a hemisphere that is self-
sufficient in the satisfaction of all of its wants. This
self-sufficiency would be accomplished by the two factors
that we have already discussed in preceding pages, namely,
industrialization and the development of Latin America’s
resources. It is expected, as we have seen, that the
industrialization of Latin America would have the twofold
effect of disposing of surplus products and satisfying a
large part of the Latins’ requirements for manufactured
goods, so that they will no longer be dependent upon export
markets. The development of the natural resources of the
southern countries is expected to supply the hemisphere
with all the materials that this country cannot supply.
The final result is supposed to be a large economic block
producing all its own products and having a flourishing
trade between its individual units. The plan is far from
being incapable of accomplishment. We have most of the
necessary materials and we are rapidly gaining the Latins’
confidence, which is, of course, necessary before we can
obtain their cooperation for the plan.
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Besides being capable of accomplishment, the
plan has a large measure of justification behind it in
spite of the fact that it ignores to a large extent the
principle laid down in the law of comparative advantage.
The rest of the world, because of its frequent wars, has
an extremely unstable influence upon our economy and the
economies of Latin American countries. Our sources of
supply are interrupted, our markets are shut down, and
our standard of living is lowered by our intensive
production of war materials for which we receive nothing
in return. Prices skyrocket and speculation booms, result-
ing in periods of false prosperity and depression and an
unstable purchasing power of money. The development of a
peaceful, self-sufficient continent would be inexpensive
insurance against the disorders caused by the chaotic
conditions of the rest of the world.
In spite of the justification for a self-sufficient
hemisphere, the plan is impractical in the final analysis
because it promises greater trouble than the disorders it aims
to avoid and because it is not in the spirit of justice.
Other parts of the world need raw materials desperately and
they mean to have them even if obtaining them means resort
to war. But aside from the prospect of war, justice demands
that the rest of the world be able to purchase from abroad
products that are not available at home. We can carry self-
sufficiency to the point where the rest of the world is able
—
,
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to obtain all of its requirements for raw materials, but
no further. Even carrying self-sufficiency to this point
may mean a greatly increased volume of trade for us with
Latin America, for eventually, with increased efficiency
on the part of the Latins, the amount of productive energy
that will have to be directed toward supplying the needs
of the rest of the world for raw materials may be only a
small part of the total, thereby leaving available a large
amount of productive energy to be used for increased trade
with the United States.
“••
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CHAPTER XV
A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE
If we Americans wish to adopt an active program
designed to Increase onr trade v/ith the southern countries
in the future, there are certain general lines of action
that we must follow. These are social, political, and
economic in their origin.
On the social front we are faced with the neces-
sity of increasing our cultural relations activities. The
form of these activities should take into consideration
that relations with the Latins are not something new but
have existed for centuries and have been of diverse sorts -
some have been on the shady side and some have been in the
spirit of the Good Samaritan. We can not ignore the history
of these relations in building for the relations of the
future. Furthermore, if we are going to foster cultural
relations with the Latins, we should know what their cul-
ture is. No one as yet has been able to give any clear
definition of the difference between American culture and
European culture, and yet we do not understand the Latins
and they do not understand us.
If we do embark upon a real cultural relations
campaign, it would be better to keep the cultural part
separate from the commercial. We should provide exchange
of ideas, publications, students, and teachers because we
. l ): , ,.J . . ..
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believe that this exchange is good in itself, and not
beca-use we hope to sell more goods or get some naval
bases. The money would probably be spent to more advan-
tage if it is administered by recognized cultural agencies
such as the American Council of Learned .Societies, the
Institute of International Education, the American Library
Association, and other similar institutions
. (1
)
A stimulation of travel in Latin American coun-
tries, a translation of their books into English, the
encouragement of the study of the Spanish and Portugese
languages and the study of Latin American history will aid
to a large extent in greater understanding of the Latins.
On the political side of our relations with
Latin America we must definitely make up our minds just
what our policy is in respect to the southern countries.
We have no course of action to guide us in our relations
with the southern countries except what is laid down by
the administration that happens to be in power. A change
in administrations is apt to cause an abandonment of all
our present efforts to woo Latin America so that the
Latins are discouraged from making any long-term committ-
ments. We should, as a nation, make up our minds to what
extent we are willing to go in developing our relations
with Latin America and then write into our foreign policy
certain guiding lines that must be followed by whatever
( 1 ) Han'ke , L. , Op. Cit., pp. 593-596
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political party is in power. Only in this way can we
develop effective long-term cooperation between this
country and the Latin American nations.
On the economic side there are several things
that we must do.
(1) We should take a thorough inventory of
the resources and production possibilities
of the Western Hemisphere. Only in this way
can we make any plans for the future. We must
know what we have to work with before we can
map out a policy or a plan of action.
(2) We must develop all possible resources of
the southern countries. The development of
strategic materials in Latin America will
strengthen our economy in case of war and the
development of all the resources will give the
Latins more exchange with which to buy more
goods from us.
(3) We must develop some means of overcoming
the surplus products problem. One way that
this can be done, as we have already seen, is
by the growth of industrialization in Latin
America. A second way it may be done is through
the development of non-competitive agricultural
products, such as kapok, rubber, quinine, coco-
nuts, and silk. The productive energy used in
the creation of these materials, for which
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there is a shortgige
,
would replace the pro-
ductive effort now used in the creation of
surplus products. A start has already been
made in this direction by our government as
is evidenced by a grant to the Department of
Agriculture of $500,000 for experiments in the
development of rubber in Latin America. (1) A
private effort in this direction is evidenced
by Henry Ford's $20,000,000 rubber plantation
in Brazil. A third way that might help in the
solution of the surplus products problem is
through greater inter-American trade. Trade
between the Latin countries has been retarded
through their concentration on trade with the
rest of the world, but now the war has shut off
export markets and has, consequently, given
inter-American trade a great impetus. Trade
figures for the southern countries show that
there are definite possibilities, on the basis
of existing production and consumption, of the
Latins being able to help relieve one another
of surplus products. Bolivia can import more
petroleum from Venezuela and more preserved
milk from Argentina. Brazil can increase its
(1 ) Foreign Policy Reports , April 1, 1940, p. 132
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purchases of Latin American petroleum and
petroleum products. Chile and Colombia can
buy more beef and other animal products from
Argentina and Uruguay. The Dominican Republic
can buy more Latin American hides, skins,
foodstuffs, wool and petroleum. Guatemala
can import lard and foodstuffs from Argentina.
Honduras can purchase more petroleum from
Venezuela or Mexico and more leather from
Argentina. Panama and Paraguay can import
increased amounts of several agricultural
products from their neighbors. These examples
do not exhaust the list by any means. All of
the cases presented have been chosen principally
because their influence would either not affect
our exports of those materials or would affect
them very little. (1)
(4) We must aid in the expansion of industries
in Latin America for a diversification of the
Latins' productive activities will stabilize
their economies. Furthermore, the higher stan-
dard of living that will probably result from
industrialization will help increase our trade
with the southern countries.
(i ) 11Imports into the Twenty Latin American Republics
of Leading Commodities by Trade Regions," Depart -
ment of Commerce, June, 1940
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(5) We must develop adequate transportation
facilities in Latin America so that industries
can expand and so that the huge reserves of
raw materials can be made available for trade.
In a study made by the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics it was found that
Brazil possessed tremendous resources of raw
materials that were waiting for transportation
facilities before they can be developed. ( 1
)
(6) We must continue our policy of reciprocal
trade agreements, for they can be a means of
consolidating our gains in the southern coun-
tries. By means of reciprocal reductions in
tariffs we can be assured that our increased
purchases in Latin America, resulting from the
pursuit of the programs already outlined, will
be accompanied by increased sales to the Latins.
Without agreements of this sort we may find that
Europe and not the United States will be the
recipient of the benefits of the greater amount
of trade made available by industrialization and
the development of raw material resources in
Latin America.
(l) "Brazil - 1938 ,
"
Braz ilian Institute of
Geography and StatisTic s, T9oG
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(7) We must "be business-like and practical
enough to be able to make the Latins a good
offer. It is probably only through an appeal
to their pocketbooks that we can gain their
cooperation. When and if we do gain their
cooperation, we must make them realize that
cooperation means active participation and
not just passive support. In this connection
the Latins should not be encouraged to rely
entirely upon our developing markets for their
products in this country, but they should be
encouraged to put forth every effort of which
they are capable to develop markets here on
their own initiative.
Undoubtedly the program first outlined is full
of uncertainties and difficulties which we may or may not
be able to overcome. The success that we are likely to
have depends mostly upon the amount of effort that we put
forth. If we use enough skill and patience, we can prob-
ably make the Latins forget hatreds of the past and look
to a glorious future, for grudges do not last forever
unless they are constantly fed. The development of indus-
trialization and of natural resources rests purely upon
technical considerations once the Latins are willing to
cooperate with us. Our engineers rank with the best in
the world and should be able to overcome all obstacles of
if)
;
"
•
.
. .
' *-•> ^ 1
,
'
'
-105-
a technical nat-ure. All we need is sufficient effort on
the part of Congress and private agencies to put their
skill to work.
If the program that we advocate is followed
with skill and perseverance, our trade with Latin
America should reach heights hitherto never before
attained and should bring with it for the people of
this hemisphere a standard of living much higher than
any the world has ever known.
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